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ABSTRACT
This study is based on the continuing effort to broaden and improve our understanding of the
antipoverty effects of SNAP. The purpose of has been to provide estimates of the lower and
upper bound effects of accounting for SNAP benefits on the poverty headcount, gap, and
severity indices from 2012 to 2016, thereby (1) extending previous research by Tiehen, Jolliffe,
and Smeeding (2016), providing the most recent update to their work, and (2) contributing to the
growing literature on the impact of SNAP on poverty under full participation, illustrating the
full range of the program’s potential to reduce poverty. At a time when lawmakers are
contemplating making cuts to the program and instituting more stringent eligibility standards for
receiving benefits, this research provides further evidence supporting the argument that SNAP
as currently designed is an important tool for alleviating poverty, one with far greater potential
that is apparent based on reported participation and benefits.
Keywords: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; Poverty
JEL Classifications: I31, I32, I38, Q18
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1 INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is
the Nation’s flagship food assistance program. Previously known as the Food Stamp Program
until 2008, SNAP provides poor and low-income participants with benefits to buy eligible food
items in authorized retail food stores. By increasing the resources available to buy food, the
program aims to reduce hunger and food insecurity among individuals living in poor and lowincome households while also improving access to a healthy diet. Because receiving SNAP
benefits frees up income for purchasing other necessities, SNAP also plays a crucial role in
reducing poverty among a significant number of Americans.
Given perennial debates among policymakers involving the proper size and scope of
SNAP, policy leaders require quality data and research to help guide decisions regarding
potential changes to the program. Historically, the size and cost of the program have meant it is
routinely at risk from budget cuts, and even relatively small modifications have the potential to
impact millions of people. With calls to reduce spending on government food and nutrition
assistance, a clearer understanding of SNAP’s impact on poverty is critical. Thus, with a better
sense of the program’s importance in supporting the well-being of poor and low-income
households, policymakers will be more apt to make informed decisions regarding the future of
SNAP and the people that benefit from it.
SNAP is widely regarded as an integral component of the U.S. social safety net (Bartfeld
et al. 2016). Given the vital role that SNAP plays, it is worthwhile to examine the effects of the
program on participants. And one primary measure of SNAP’s effectiveness is the extent to
which the program reduces poverty. In this paper, I provide detailed estimates of the effect of
SNAP on measures reflecting the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty based on the official
poverty measure (OPM) using five years of data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement.
I contribute to the literature in two ways. First, I examine the antipoverty effects of
SNAP from 2012 to 2016, providing the most recent update to previous research by Tiehen,
Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) that examined the effect of SNAP on poverty from 1984 to 2011.
Second, considering that underreporting of SNAP participation and benefits in the survey data
causes an understatement of the antipoverty effects of SNAP, I use program eligibility
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requirements and information on the benefit formula to approximate the impacts of full
participation in SNAP on poverty, illustrating the entire range of SNAP’s antipoverty effects.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In section two, I begin by providing
background on SNAP, both on its current state and on the program’s history. In section three, I
give a survey of the literature on SNAP and describe prior research into its antipoverty effects.
In section four, I discuss the data and methods used to estimate the antipoverty effects of SNAP
and explain in detail how the antipoverty effects of full participation in SNAP are estimated. In
section five, I assess the procedure for constructing the antipoverty effects, examine the effects
of SNAP on the poverty rate, the poverty gap index, and the poverty severity index, and discuss
the findings in the context of preceding research. The final section summarizes and concludes
with policy implications.

2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview of the Program
A notable feature of SNAP is its unique status as a near-universal entitlement: SNAP is
available to most needy households with limited income and assets. This distinctive feature
separates SNAP from other food and nutrition assistance programs, which are tailored to benefit
specific subpopulations such as infants, school children, or elderly persons (Oliveira et al.
2018a). The program has a broad reach that is rare among food assistance programs as well as
other social assistance programs. Unlike other programs, eligibility is not limited by age, family
structure, or employment status2 (Bartfeld et al. 2016). The same cannot be said of eligibility for
Social Security, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or Disability Insurance and
Unemployment Insurance (Ziliak 2016).
2.1.1 SNAP Recipients
Of the millions of individuals served by SNAP, the program helps some of the most vulnerable
populations in our society, namely children, the elderly, the disabled (Gray et al. 2016). Some
2

While SNAP is available to most nonworking families, there is a 3-month time limit on eligibility for benefits
among nondisabled adults without dependents that are not working at least an average 20 hours per week each
month (FNS 2018a). Similarly, benefits are available to lawfully present noncitizens only if they been residents for
at least 5 years and have a work history of at least 5 years (FNS 2017a).
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20.1 million children, for instance, benefited from the program in 2015 (Gray et al. 2016). In
fact, children made up 44 percent of all SNAP participants that same year (Gray et al. 2016).
Furthermore, it has been estimated that nearly one in two American children will receive food
assistance during their childhood (Rank and Hirschl 2009). Elderly and nonelderly adults with
disabilities, meanwhile, represented an additional 12 percent of the SNAP caseload in 2015
(Gray et al. 2016).
SNAP is also an indispensable form of support for those in deep poverty (when
household income is less than or equal to 50 percent of the poverty level) as well as the working
poor. Almost half of participating SNAP households (43 percent) live in deep poverty.
Furthermore, many recipients of SNAP have jobs, despite not earning an income high enough to
be lifted out of poverty. In fact, 32 percent of SNAP households had earned income in 2015
(Gray et al. 2016).
2.1.2 Program Size: Participation Levels and Costs
A vast number of people rely at least partly on SNAP to meet their food needs. In 2017, SNAP
served on average 42.2 million individuals per month, a figure that exceeds the entire population
of California—the most populous state in the union—by more than 2.7 million people (FNS
2018e). Put another way, 13.6 percent of the U.S. population—approximately one in seven
Americans—used SNAP benefits to meet some or all of their food needs any given month that
same year (Figure 1). The number of SNAP recipients went up by 53 percent from 2000 to
2007, which coincided with the increased adoption of the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT)
system of distributing benefits as an alternative to the paper coupons. Participation in SNAP
then rose an additional 81 percent from 2007 to 2013 during the most recent recession due to a
combination of both increased need from worsening economic conditions and policy decisions,
like the temporary increase in the maximum benefit used to calculate all SNAP allotments and
the temporarily waiving the eligibility time limit for nondisabled adults without dependents
(Gray and Cunnyngham 2016). Following peak participation in 2013, the number of recipients
has declined for four consecutive years but is still well above pre-recession levels.
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Figure 1. Annual Benefits and Average Monthly Participation in SNAP, Fiscal Years
2000–17
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Source: “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs,” Food and Nutrition Service, last
published May 5, 2018.

In addition, the cost associated with SNAP is significant. Total outlays for the program
equaled $68.1 billion in 2017, eclipsing expenditures on all other food assistance programs
combined (Figure 1) (Oliveira et al. 2018a). Beyond food assistance programs, SNAP is one of
the largest means-tested social assistance programs in the United States. Specifically, SNAP
was the third most expensive means-tested program in the United States in 2015, trailing behind
only Medicaid and earned income and child tax credits (Oliveira et al. 2018a).
2.2 History of the Program
The history of the Food Stamp Program and its eventual successor, SNAP, can be divided into
five main stages. The first deals with the Great Depression–era Food Stamp Program prototype
in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The second is marked by the rollout of a series of food stamp
programs ultimately leading to the permanent authorization of the Food Stamp Program during
the 1960s. The next phase of the program occurred in the 1970s and is characterized by the
standardization of eligibility requirements, the program’s spread nationwide, and its transition to
an entitlement program. The decade and a half that followed was a time in which eligibility for
11

the program became more stringent. And finally, the last period includes the policy changes and
increases in participation associated with the Great Recession.
2.2.1 The Origins of the Food Stamp Program
One can trace the origins of the Food Stamp Program back to the advent of the Great
Depression, during which, paradoxically, the economy was flush with surplus agricultural
commodities and yet large portions of the population experienced severe hunger stemming from
pervasive unemployment. The Food Stamp Plan was implemented in 1937 to channel surplus
agricultural goods to the unemployed in an attempt to bolster the price of agricultural
commodities while simultaneously providing relief to the hungry. The program operated using a
two-color stamp system. Those in need of assistance could buy orange stamps equal to their
ordinary food expenditures, and for each $1 worth of orange stamps the recipient bought, the
recipient received a bonus of 50 cents worth in blue stamps. While orange stamps could be used
to purchase any food, blue stamps could be used only on food the USDA declared to be in
surplus. At its highest point, participation was 4 million (FNS 2017b).
The entry of the U.S. into World War II, however, rendered the Food Stamp Plan
unnecessary. Both unemployment and agricultural surpluses declined as resources were devoted
to the war effort. Thus, by 1943 the conditions that led to the creation of the program—namely
large amounts of unmarketable agricultural commodities and widespread unemployment—were
no longer present. For that reason, the Food Stamp Plan was terminated in 1943 (Caswell and
Yaktine 2013).
Nearly two decades later the idea of reinstating another food stamp program reemerged,
and President Kennedy, in keeping with a campaign promise, announced the launch of a series
of food stamp pilot programs in 1961 (FNS 2017b). Like the Food Stamp Plan, the pilot
programs retained the requirement that food stamps be purchased and that they could be used
only to buy domestically produced food for home consumption. Unlike the Food Stamp Plan,
however, there were no longer special stamps for surplus foods (FNS 2017b). Although it began
in eight sites, the initiative would eventually expand to 43 in 22 states with 380,000 participants
by 1964. The success of these pilot programs led to the permanent authorization of the Food
Stamp Program with the Food Stamp Act, which President Johnson signed into law in 1964 as
part of his War on Poverty (Caswell and Yaktine 2013). The growth of enrollment in the
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program was rather sluggish, though. Even by 1969, the program had fewer than 3 million
participants (Bartfeld et al. 2016).
2.2.2 The Beginning of the Modern Food Stamp Program
Before 1971, states were responsible for crafting eligibility standards, and thus whether a
household was eligible for food stamp benefits varied from state to state. That, however,
changed in 1974 when Congress passed amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, replacing
state-by-state rules with nationally established eligibility standards (Caswell and Yaktine 2013).
These nationally uniform eligibility criteria were based on (and still are, in part) a net income
limit and an asset limit. Net income is determined by subtracting certain stipulated deductions,
(such as shelter, medical, and educational, among others) from gross income. Concerning assets,
some basic categories (such as a home and one car) are not counted as resources used when
determining eligibility (Oliveira et al. 2018b). To be eligible for food stamp benefits, an
applicant’s net income and the value of assets must be below the thresholds.
The next legislative action that enlarged the Food Stamp Program came with the passage
of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, which mandated that states expand the
program to every locality before July 1, 1974 (FNS 2017b). By 1974 the program had spread to
all fifty states and was operating in every county in the country. This act also lifted the
restriction on purchasing imported foods, shifting the emphasis of the program from agricultural
support to food assistance.
Moreover, at this time the Food Stamp program began to be considered an entitlement,
meaning that Congress has never failed to fund the program entirely. In other words, no eligible
applicant has ever been denied benefits (Oliveira 2018a). Because any individual that meets the
specified requirements is automatically eligible to receive assistance, the program caseload
fluctuates based on the current macroeconomic conditions and participation is therefore
naturally countercyclical. During an economic downturn, unemployment grows, which
suppresses household incomes and thereby increases the need for the program. Periods marked
by strong economic performance have relatively lower levels of unemployment, higher
household incomes, and corresponding lower demand for the program.
Further changes in the program occurred with the enactment of the 1977 Food Stamp
Act, most notably the discontinuation of the purchase requirement. On the one hand, the rule
requiring recipients to buy food stamps hindered participation in the program because many
13

Americans lived in households too poor to afford the upfront cost of the food stamps. On the
other hand, the purchase requirement guaranteed that each participating household received an
allotment equal to a low-cost nutritionally adequate diet, which could be spent only on food. In
the end, the purchase requirement was eliminated, and the change went into effect in 1979.
Consequently, participation in the program rose rapidly almost instantly. Indeed, during the first
month in which the purchase requirement no longer applied, enrollment experienced a
substantial increase of 1.5 million people compared to the preceding month (Caswell and
Yaktine 2013; FNS 2017b).
2.2.3 Eligibility Becomes More Stringent
After an era marked by expanding participation and growing costs, the Food Stamp Program
came under the greater scrutiny of both the executive branch and Congress in the early 1980s.
One significant legislative action that was taken was the introduction of an additional income
test in which an applicant’s the gross income must be at or below 130 percent of the poverty
guideline (FNS 2017b). The gross income limit was imposed to ensure that only families
considered truly in need received benefits, not those with high gross incomes that could declare
low net incomes after the deductions. Subsequent legislation also decreased the frequency of
cost-of-living adjustments for allotments (Caswell and Yaktine 2013).
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, what is
commonly referred to as “Welfare Reform,” reduced program participation both directly and
indirectly. Besides freezing the maximum benefit and placing caps on some deductions, it
directly reduced participation by making some individuals ineligible to receive food stamp
benefits (Ziliak 2016). It ended eligibility of most legal immigrants to food stamps, which was
later partially restored in 2002 to those that have resided in the U.S. for at least five years and
receiving certain disability payments or have children. It placed a time limit on food stamp
receipt of three out of 36 months for non-disabled adults between the ages of 18 to 49 without
dependents who are not working at least 20 hours a week or participating in a work program. It
also eliminated benefits for convicted drug felons (FNS 2017b). Moreover, because those on
TANF are automatically eligible to receive food stamp benefits, by curtailing the number of
people on TANF, Welfare Reform also indirectly reduced participation in the Food Stamp
Program (Ziliak 2016). Participation fell precipitously from 1993 to 2000—over 40 percent—
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and even the fraction of eligible persons participating declined 25 percent, decreasing from 67
percent to just 50 percent (Ziliak 2016).
2.2.4 The Early 2000s and the Great Recession to Now
Participation rebounded, growing steadily throughout the 2000s. Food stamp participation
increased from about 17.2 million in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to 26 million people in July of FY
2007 (Figure 1) (FNS 2018e). This is also the time when the EBT spread as the way in which
recipients accessed benefits. EBT is a system in which a SNAP recipient uses electronic benefits
that are not unlike a debit card to pay for products after funds from a government account are
transferred to a retailer account. SNAP benefits are deposited in the recipient’s account each
month and the card and can be used in any state. Funds not used in one month are added to the
next (FNS 2017b).
With the passage of the 2008 farm bill, the official name of the Food Stamp Program
was changed to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The name change marked the
end of the old-fashioned physical coupons and their full, nationwide replacement by the EBT
system as the means of delivering benefits to recipients (FNS 2017b). The new name also serves
to reduce the stigma associated with participating in the program by underscoring the idea that
benefits are intended to support a household in obtaining a nutritionally adequate diet by
supplementing the household’s existing expenditure on food.
Apart from changing the name of the program, the 2008 farm bill included several policy
changes: it increased the minimum benefit; it raised the standard deduction; it eliminated the cap
on the child care deduction; it indexed the threshold for assets to inflation; and it excluded most
retirement accounts from countable assets (FNS 2017b). Except for the higher minimum benefit,
all of these measures had the impact of expanding the pool of SNAP-eligible individuals.
This period is also significant in that it includes the Great Recession, which spanned
from 2007 to 2009 and was the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Not
surprisingly, participation in SNAP and costs connected with the program rose dramatically
during and following the economic collapse (Figure 1). This increase in the level of SNAP
participation largely mirrored the widespread surge in unemployment that occurred in the wake
of the financial crisis. In 2007 the unemployment rate stood at 4.6 percent, and by 2010 it had
more than doubled to 9.6 percent (BLS 2018). From FY 2008 to FY 2013, the SNAP caseload
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grew by about 81 percent, climbing to an all-time high of more than 47 million individuals
(Figure 1) (Oliveira et al. 2018a; 2018b).
In light of the increased economic hardship facing many low-income households, and in
an effort to help revitalize the economy, Congress temporarily augmented the maximum benefit
used to calculate all SNAP allotments by 13.6 percent as part of the 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act, commonly known as “the stimulus package” (Bartfeld et al. 2016). The
action had the effect of increasing benefits by $80 for a family of four, and it also encouraged
more eligible nonparticipants to join the program (Caswell and Yaktine 2013).
Although the increase was intended to be phased out gradually as SNAP’s benefits
adjusted for food price inflation caught up with the newly set maximum benefits, inflation was
lower than expected and Congress determined that the increase should end earlier than the
scheduled 2015 phase-out. On November 1, 2013, the nonpermanent increase abruptly ended
with benefits reduced to 2009 inflation-adjusted levels, which, for a family of four, decreased
the maximum allotment by 5.4 percent (Oliviera et al. 2018b). Put another way, the change
meant that benefits for a family of three shrank by $29 per month (Bartfeld et al. 2016). The
SNAP caseload has declined each of the past four years since peak participation, ultimately
falling from 47.6 million in 2013 to 42.2 million in 2017 (Figure 1). This decrease is attributable
to the improving economy as well as lower benefit levels.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW
In the past few decades has SNAP received increased attention from both the policy and
research community. Research and policy interest grew with the consistent rise in program
participation and the corresponding increase in its cost throughout the 2000s (Ziliak 2016).
Moreover, the Food Stamp Program was established during a time in which hunger and
malnutrition were serious social issues (Blank 1997). As the problems of hunger and
malnutrition largely receded by the 1990s, lines of research have developed focusing on the
program’s impacts on other participant outcomes, namely economic well-being, food spending,
food security, nutrition, and health, as well as overweight and obesity prevalence (Oliveira et al.
2018a). A brief overview of the literature is provided here.
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3.1 Food Spending
This branch of the SNAP literature focuses on trying to better understand the relationship
between SNAP benefits and food spending of participating households. Studies have been
concerned with two main ideas: (1) investigating how the in-kind nature of SNAP benefits
influences food spending decisions and (2) estimating how much food spending is expected to
rise with an increase in SNAP benefits, what is referred to as the marginal propensity to spend
on food out of SNAP benefits (Hoynes, McGranahan, and Schanzenbach 2016). Most recent
research indicates that the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp income is
close to the marginal propensity to consume out of cash income (Hoynes, McGranahan, and
Schanzenbach 2016).
Earlier reviews of the literature, in contrast, concluded that the marginal propensity to
spend on food out of SNAP benefits was substantially higher than the marginal propensity to
spend on food out of cash, the former being a multiple of the latter, ranging anywhere a factor of
two to a factor of ten. The median marginal propensity to spend on food out food stamp benefits
from a collection of studies was 3.8 times greater than that out of cash income (Fraker 1990;
Levedahl 1995). The results of these observational studies, however, are subject to selection
bias. Typical of the literature at that time, participation in the program was treated exogenously
when in fact it is a choice variable, and estimates were based on comparing food stamp
recipients to similar nonrecipients. If program participation is positively related with tastes for
food consumption—as it is—then these early studies overestimate the marginal propensity to
spend on food out of SNAP benefits (Hoynes, McGranahan, and Schanzenbach 2016).
Later research took advantage of randomized experiments in the 1990s in which the
USDA gave some participants food stamp benefits in the typical form while others were given
cash to purchase food. Findings revealed a dramatically lower marginal propensity to spend on
food out of food stamp benefits, one much closer to parity with that of cash. Families that
received the in-kind food stamp benefits spent merely 5 percent more on food than those who
received the food stamps benefit in the form of cash (Ohls et al. 1992; Fraker, Marini, and Ohls
1995). Recent quasi-experimental research analyzing the introduction of the Food Stamp
Program from 1961 to 1975 across 3,000 counties also confirms the conclusion that the
marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamp income is similar to the marginal
propensity to spend on food out of cash (Hoynes and Schanzenback 2009).
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3.2 Food Insecurity
Because SNAP increases the food purchasing power of low-income households, the program is
expected to help participants acquire more, healthier food than they could otherwise afford.
Therefore, SNAP should reduce the likelihood that a household experiences food hardships, as
defined as instances of not having enough money to buy the necessary amount of food. Only
recently has research begun to support this commonsense association, however (Gregory et al.
2016).
Counterintuitively, many studies based on simple associations have frequently identified
the inverse relationship between participation in the Food Stamp Program and food insecurity.
The descriptive comparisons indicate that food insecurity is substantially higher in SNAP
households than in other households. For example, one relatively recent report calculates that,
among SNAP-eligible households, 52 percent of SNAP participants reported being food
insecure whereas only 28 percent of nonparticipants reported such (Coleman-Jensen et al.
2012). Other studies that control for observable characteristics still find positive, albeit lower,
associations between SNAP participation and food insecurity (Bhattacharya and Currie 2001;
Ribar and Hamrick 2003). However, these comparisons can often be misleading given that
participation in the program is a choice variable and the population of recipients is
systematically different than the population of eligible nonrecipients.
By and large, studies examining SNAP’s impact on food insecurity that make use of
instrumental variable regressions have yielded inconclusive results (Gregory et al. 2016). One
paper found the predicted negative associations, though most estimates were only marginally
significant (Borjas 2004). Research conducted using endogenous latent variable methods has
also obtained imprecise and statistically insignificant results (Huffman and Jensen 2003;
Gundersen and Oliveira 2001). Even more recent studies have generated estimates that are
consistent with both positive and negative effects (Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick 2013;
Shaefer and Gutierrez 2012). Thus, this line of research has not demonstrated any relationship
between SNAP benefits and food insecurity.
The findings of another branch of the literature, by contrast, show that SNAP does
reduce the likelihood of food insecurity. Some researchers have focused on how food insecurity
varies with a higher degree of participation in SNAP. One study revealed that household food
security declined substantially, 10.6 percentage points, after participating in SNAP for six
months (Mabli 2013). In other words, the degree to which a household experiences food
18

security decreases as the length of participation in SNAP increases. Other research has
examined the effect of losing SNAP benefits on food insecurity. These studies find that
households are at a higher risk of food insufficiency and insecurity after losing benefits
(Gundersen and Gruber 2001; Mykerezi and Mills 2010).
Another area of research has drawn upon the temporary increase in SNAP benefits that
took place from 2009 until 2013. The findings of these studies are consistent with the
understanding that SNAP participation decreases food insecurity. Nord and Prell (2011)
examined food security during this time and the expansion of SNAP eligibility for jobless adults
without children that occurred with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The
study found that food insecurity among lower-income households decreased by 2.2 percentage
points, while food insecurity increased by 0.16 percentage points among those households with
annual incomes slightly above that which is necessary to be considered eligible to participate in
SNAP. A more recent study found that as food price inflation eroded the value of SNAP
benefits during the years when the temporary benefit increase was in effect, the amount of
SNAP-recipient households with very low food security rose (Nord 2013). The findings suggest
that the fall in the real value of SNAP benefits contributed to the rise in low food security.
3.3 Nutrition, Diet Quality, and Health
The fundamental question that this branch of the literature is concerned with is how does SNAP
influence the nutritional and health outcomes of its participants? SNAP benefits enable
participants to buy more, more nutritious foods. As a result, one would expect the program to
raise nutritional intake and diet quality among participants. As with other realms of SNAP
research, however, determining the exact relationship is no easy task. The main difficulty in
evaluating the program is that participants are not selected at random from the population.
Concerning nutrition and diet quality, Fox et al. (2004) surveyed 14 studies and
concluded that the consensus of the literature dealing with household nutrient availability is that
the influence of the Food Stamp Program on dietary intake is minimal. One more paper
analyzing the impact of SNAP on the nutritional quality of recipients’ diets was neither positive
nor negative (Gregory et al. 2013).
There also exists, however, a great deal of research shows that SNAP positively
influences the health of those who participate. Many studies investigate the staggered initiation
of the Food Stamp Program and measure the impact of the program using a difference-in19

difference approach. The findings of these papers show that the program led to improved health
outcomes, such as increases in birth weight and food consumption (Hoynes and Schanzenbach
2009; Currie and Moretti 2008; Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach 2011). When looking at
the long-run impacts of the Food Stamp Program, those exposed to the program while infants
(age zero to five) exhibited lower incidences of undesirable health outcomes in adulthood—high
blood pressure as well as diabetes, for instance (Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond 2016).
Another aspect of the health research on SNAP is whether receiving benefits contributes
to the likelihood that participants will be overweight or obese. In other words, might a program
implemented to eradicate hunger and improve nutritional outcomes among the poor now
ironically be fueling the rise in obesity? Results of studies addressing this relationship between
SNAP and obesity have run the gamut. Although some studies have shown there is a positive
relationship for nonelderly women, in general, studies find the impact to be negligible. Some
even find that SNAP reduces obesity.
Of the few studies that indicated that participation in SNAP does lead to a higher
probability of being overweight or obese, the positive relationship is limited to nonelderly
women. Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk (2008) show that female participants are 5.9 percent more
likely to be overweight or obese than eligible female nonparticipants. For men, however, there is
no statistically significant impact of SNAP participation on weight status. Another study also
finds a negligible impact for men and positive impact for women, albeit quite small (Baum
2011).
Meanwhile, other recent studies find SNAP participation does not contribute to obesity
or being overweight. Fan (2010) does not find any evidence of a connection between SNAP and
obesity. Similarly, other research has shown that SNAP doesn’t increase the probability of
gaining too much weight during pregnancy (Baum 2012). Furthermore, a review of studies
revealed the consensus of the literature is that the use of SNAP benefits is not associated with an
increase in the likelihood of being overweight or obese for most participants (Ver Poleg and
Ralston 2008). There is also a portion of the literature that indicates that SNAP benefits reduce
the probability of being obese. For instance, there is evidence that children of SNAPparticipating households are less likely to be obese than those from nonparticipating households
(Schmeiser 2012; Burgstahler et al. 2012).
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3.5 Antipoverty Effects
Beyond the primary goals of SNAP to promote nutrition and decrease food insecurity among
low-income households, researchers have been interested in other methods of evaluating the
program. With respect to economic well being, economists have assessed the impact of SNAP
on poverty. There have been two main lines of research dealing with the antipoverty effects of
SNAP. The first has a long history, spanning back to the eighties, and makes use of the OPM.
However, because the OPM is calculated without incorporating the monetary value of in-kind
government transfers like SNAP benefits or Medicaid when determining family income, it does
not capture the effect of SNAP in reducing poverty (Blank 2004). A widely adopted approach
for measuring the extent to which SNAP reduces and alleviates poverty, therefore, involves
including the value of benefits in the calculation of family income and analyzing how doing so
influences the incidence of poverty (Bartfeld 2016). The second line of research is more recent
and makes use of the supplemental poverty measure (SPM), which was based on the
recommendations of the 1995 Poverty Report and has only become available since 2009. This
approach uses a broader definition of resources to include some in-kind government benefits
like food assistance and housing subsidies and incorporates taxes. If a household above the SPM
poverty level falls below the threshold after subtracting the SNAP benefits from family
resources, that household is counted as being lifted from poverty due to SNAP (Short 2011).
3.5.1 Official Poverty Measure
Following two decades of steady growth in government noncash benefits, the Census Bureau
began to explore alternative methods for estimating poverty that used definitions of income that
included the value of specific noncash benefits (Census Bureau 1982; 1984). The first of these
technical papers found that the market value of food and housing subsidies alone lowered the
poverty rate from 11.1 percent to 9.4 percent in 1979 (Census Bureau 1982). Cunnyngham
(2001) analyzed how food stamp benefits altered the relative distribution of the poor. After
including of the value of food stamps as part of the gross income used to determine eligibility,
receiving food stamps lifted 6 percent of food stamp households above the poverty guideline,
and 16 percent moved from below half of the poverty guideline to above. Food stamp benefits
were responsible for shifting the percentage of households that fall into this category of deep
poverty from 33.4 percent to 17.9 percent. Moreover, using data from the March CPS and
marginal dominance analysis, Bishop, Formby, and Zeager (1996) studied the effectiveness of
21

the Food Stamp Program at reducing the poverty rate over time by comparing 1990 with 1982.
They concluded that the program was more effective in 1990 than in 1982 in reducing the
prevalence of poverty when 75 percent of the poverty line and below is used as the threshold.
The poverty gap after accounting for the value of food stamps was lower in 1990 than in 1982
irrespective of the poverty line selected.
Joliffe et al. (2005) examined the Food Stamp Program’s impact on reducing and
alleviating child poverty as measured by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) measures of
poverty—the poverty headcount, the poverty gap index, and poverty severity index. Using
twelve years of data from the CPS-ASEC, spanning from 1988 to 2000, the authors calculate
household income after adding the reported value of SNAP benefits received. After calculating
family income with and without SNAP benefits, the estimates of the antipoverty effects of the
Food Stamp Program are drawn from comparing the percent decline in each of the three poverty
measurements for every year analyzed. While food stamp benefits did not noticeably affect the
poverty headcount among children, they lowered both the poverty gap and poverty severity
dramatically. For any given year, food stamp benefits decreased the poverty gap index among
children by 20 percent, on average. Similarly, they decreased the squared poverty gap index
among children by a sizable 28 percent.
Extending previous research, Tiehen, Gundersen, and Joliffe (2012) conducted another
study using the same methodology described above. They analyzed the period from 2001 to
2009, which encompassed the 2007 recession. Along with the earlier focus on child poverty, the
researchers also examined the antipoverty impact of SNAP benefits on the general population as
well as metropolitan and rural areas. They find that for any given year analyzed the prevalence
of poverty among the general population fell by 4.4 percent on average due to SNAP benefits.
Consistent with previous findings, the effects of SNAP on the poverty gap and severity indices
were more substantial than the program’s effect on the poverty rate. On average, the inclusion of
SNAP benefits was responsible for a drop in the poverty gap index by 10.3 percent and a
decline in the poverty severity index by 13.2 percent. Concerning metropolitan and rural areas,
this relationship of a SNAP having a more substantial impact on the depth and severity of
poverty held regardless of whether the area was urban or rural. When looking at the impact on
child poverty, the results are similar to the findings of Joliffe et al. (2005). The effect of
supplementing income with benefits reduced the incidence of child poverty by 5.6 percent,
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whereas it decreased the gap by 15.5 percent and severity by 21.3 among children living in poor
households.
Shaefer and Edin (2013) focused exclusively on how SNAP benefits reduce the number
of extremely poor households with children. They investigated the rise of extreme poverty and
analyzed the effect of adding SNAP benefits to household income and calculating the resulting
reduction in extreme poverty. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), the authors document how the expansion of SNAP mitigated, albeit did not wholly
prevent, the increase in the prevalence of extreme poverty from 1996 to mid-2011. The number
of extremely poor households—those with a self-reported total household income that equates
to $2 or less per person, per day—grew steadily after 1996. As a percent of all households,
households in extreme poverty increased from 1.7 percentage points in 1996 to 4.3 percentage
points in 2011. Yet when SNAP benefits are included as income, extremely poor households
represented 1.3 percentage points of total households in 1996 and only grew to 2.2 percentage
points in 2011. Thus, after incorporating SNAP benefits into income, extreme poverty increased
by 80.4 percent from 1996 to 2011, which otherwise would have risen by 159.1 percent without
SNAP benefits over the same time. Lastly, in 2011 alone SNAP benefits lowered the amount of
extremely poor households with children by 48.0 percent.
Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) found that in 2011 the official poverty rate was
15.0 percent, whereas accounting for SNAP benefits in family income reduced the poverty rate
to 13.8 percent. This 8 percent reduction in the poverty rate meant that roughly 3.9 million
fewer people were counted as living in poverty in 2011. They also provide further evidence that
SNAP benefits have an even stronger influence on those in deep poverty. In 2011, 20.4 million
Americans (6.6 percent of the population) lived in deep poverty. The rate of deep poverty in
2011 decreased by 16.6 percent after incorporating SNAP benefits, resulting in 3.4 million
fewer people being measured as living in deep poverty.
Other research has been conducted using the OPM with a wider array of resources,
meaning the inclusion of noncash transfers like SNAP benefits and housing subsidies. For
instance, Bitler and Hoynes (2013) find that accounting for SNAP benefits was responsible for a
decline in the poverty rate of 1 percentage point in 1982 (a 7 percent drop) and 1.4 percentage
points in 2010 (a 13 percent drop). Conversely, Scholz, Moffit, and Cowan (2009) and BenShalom, Moffitt, and Scholz (2012) produce lower estimates of the antipoverty impact of SNAP
on the poverty rate. They find a mere 0.4-percentage point drop attributable to a SNAP after
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accounting for benefits. Importantly, however, the analysis they employ excludes all other
government social programs, which means the results are interpreted as the antipoverty effect of
SNAP in the absence of programs like Social Security and unemployment benefits.
As mentioned before, a notable recent development in the literature on estimating the
antipoverty impact of SNAP involves the research on the SPM, which includes SNAP benefits
in the definition of income. For example, in 2011, 15.2 percent of Americans were considered to
be poor as measured by the SPM and if SNAP benefits were subtracted from income, the SPM
poverty rate would have been 17.6 percent. This 2.4 percentage point difference translates into
4.6 million fewer poor individuals (Short 2012). Also, Short (2015) calculated using the SPM
that family income inclusive of SNAP benefits lifted 4.7 million people out of poverty in 2014,
2.1 million of whom were children. Similarly, other research has shown the impact of food and
nutrition programs is the reduced child poverty rates by approximately 3–4 percentage points in
2012 (Fox et al. 2015). In 2016, the SPM poverty rate was 14 percent, and without SNAP it
would have been 1.1 percentage points lower (7 percent), decreasing the number of people
counted as living in poverty by 3.6 million.
3.5.3 Underreporting of SNAP
One of the most serious challenges facing researchers interested in investigating the antipoverty
impacts of SNAP stems from underreporting of SNAP recipiency. Several studies have
documented significant underreporting of SNAP in the CPS and other large national surveys
such as SIPP and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Wheaton 2008; Meyer, Mok,
and Sullivan 2009; Parker 2011; Sullivan 2011). Some respondents may underreport
participation status and benefit levels because of a social stigma associated with using social
assistance programs. Others may be merely unable to correctly recall whether they participated
in the program or the exact amount of benefits received over the previous twelve months,
particularly if they only participate intermittently. Either way, underreporting of SNAP is
extensive. With the CPS in 2011, for example, self-reported participation in the program was
69.7 percent of the average monthly individual participation shown in SNAP administrative
data, and the total of respondents SNAP benefits only equaled 54.4 percent of actual total
expenditure in administrative records (Tiehen et al. 2016).
Although many studies earlier acknowledged the gravity of the problem of
underreporting, many did not take actions to correct for it. Tiehen et al. (2012) recognize the
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shortcoming of the data and discuss how it would lead to an underestimation of the antipoverty
effect of SNAP. They state that future research assessing the program would benefit from
methods to correct for misreporting making use of administrative data. Shaefer and Edin (2013),
meanwhile, also do not correct for underreporting but defend their use of PSID along the lines
that misreporting, while still dramatic, is less so in that dataset relative to the CPS and SIPP.
Only relatively recently has some research been conducted that seriously addresses the problem
of underreporting in the data used for evaluating SNAP (Kreider, Gundersen, and Jolliffe 2012).
This relatively new body of research finds that correcting for underreporting increases
estimates of SNAP’s antipoverty effect considerably. Wheaton (2008) finds that correcting for
underreporting increases the impact of the Food Stamp Program on the poverty rate in 2004 by
86 percent. This correction for underreporting increases the estimate of the number of persons
removed from poverty by food stamps from 1.7 million to 3.2 million. Sherman and Trisi (2015)
illustrate the effect of correction for underreporting on the SPM in 2012 and find that SNAP
removed 10.3 million people from poverty that year as well as 5.2 million from deep poverty
that same year. The data with corrections for underreporting for these two papers come from the
Transfer Income Model Version III (TRIM III) policy microsimulation model, which is a joint
partnership between the Urban Institute and the Department of Health and Human Services.
Based on USDA administrative data on recipients and benefits, Tiehen, Jolliffe, and
Smeeding (2016) examine 2011 and also find a substantial effect after adjusting for
underreporting. After the number of poor SNAP recipients below 51 percent of the poverty line
and the number between 51 and 100 percent of the poverty line match the numbers recorded in
administrative data, benefits are scaled up until they equal administrative records of total
outlays. As a consequence, the resulting antipoverty effects of SNAP are significantly larger.
The antipoverty effect of SNAP on the poverty rate in 2011 doubles from 8.0 to 15.9 percent,
leading to 8 million fewer poor people, rather than 3.9 million as previously estimated. And the
impact of adjusting for underreporting has an even more extensive effect on the antipoverty
estimates of the depth and severity of poverty. The percent decline in the depth of poverty due
to SNAP increased markedly from 15.1 to 40.7 percent, and percent reduction in the severity
due to SNAP grew from 19 percent to 54.4.
Wheaton and Tran (2018) offer the most recent analysis, focusing on the year 2015,
using the SPM. They find that SNAP removed 8.4 million people from poverty in 2015 after
correcting for underreporting, reducing the poverty rate from 15.4 percent to 12.8 percent (a
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reduction of 17 percent). While there have been several studies that have examined the effect of
SNAP benefits on poverty, Wheaton and Tran (2018) provide a rare estimation of the
antipoverty effects of full participation in SNAP in addition to correcting for underreporting.
They estimate that full participation in SNAP would lead to an additional 1 million being lifted
from poverty, or that the program had the potential to reduce poverty by 9.4 million in 2015.
By providing estimates of the antipoverty effects of SNAP during the period from 2012
through 2016, this paper represents an extension of the work by Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding
(2016), in which antipoverty estimates are provided only up to 2011. Moreover, the present
paper contributes to the growing literature on the effects of government food and nutrition
assistance on poverty, examining the antipoverty effects of full participation in SNAP. These
results assume a take-up rate of 100 percent, meaning that all SNAP-eligible individuals enroll
in the program. And by estimating an upper bound of the program’s antipoverty effects, the
results of this study serve as a benchmark against which the antipoverty estimates from previous
studies can be compared to evaluate the extent that SNAP is achieving its full potential
antipoverty effects.

4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data Description
The estimates in this study are constructed using five years of cross-sectional data from the
CPS-ASEC from 2012 to 2016. Administered monthly by the Census Bureau on behalf of the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the survey is conducted using a
scientifically selected, nationally representative sample of approximately 60,000 households in
which all states (and the District of Columbia) are included. The CPS is conducted using a 4–8–
4 sampling scheme: Respondents are first interviewed once per month for four consecutive
months and then again eight months later for questioning once per month four another four
consecutive months, after which they permanently leave the sample (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).
Besides the ordinary questions dealing with employment data, the CPS often includes
supplemental questions pertaining to topics beyond the employment and unemployment
situation, including veteran status, school enrollment, voting and registration, and food
security—among others. Respondents to the CPS-ASEC provide information on several
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different sources of income received—including some noncash income sources such as SNAP—
and program participation in the previous calendar year. Census Bureau publishes these data in
the annual report on income and poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Because these data are the
source used for estimating official government statistics on poverty, and in keeping with the
research nature of similar previous studies, CPS-ASEC is the most appropriate dataset for the
present study.
My estimates differ from those of the Census Bureau because, to simplify the analysis,
only observations with one family in the household are considered. The definition of a SNAP
household is one in which the individuals live, grocery shop, prepare meals, and eat together.
Thus not all multifamily households will fall into that category and distinguishing the
appropriate filing unit is beyond the scope of this paper. Restricting the analysis to one-family
households ensures family size is equivalent to household size, which is an essential variable for
determining SNAP eligibility and benefit allotments. For that reason, the estimates of all
poverty metrics will not be identical to official measures. They will, however, serve as an
adequate baseline to which other poverty metrics incorporating SNAP benefits can be
compared.
4.2 Methodology
Using data from CPS-ASEC, I add the value of SNAP benefits to family income and compared
several measures of annual poverty with and without SNAP benefits to measure the effects of
SNAP on poverty. However, as mentioned above, because underreporting is pervasive in
regards to both participation and benefits, estimates derived from this method understate the
actual impact of SNAP on alleviating poverty and therefore ought to be treated as the lower
bound of the antipoverty effect of SNAP. Keeping this fact in mind, this study estimates the
upper bound of the antipoverty effect of SNAP by identifying all households that are eligible for
SNAP and constructing the maximum amount of benefits those households would receive. After
using respondents’ information to calculate SNAP eligibility of households and approximate
their corresponding would-be allotment of SNAP benefits, I estimate the antipoverty effects of
SNAP under the conditions of full participation the same as before. In the rest of this section, I
describe the details behind the construction of the lower and upper bound eligibility and
benefits.
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4.2.1 Estimation of the Lower Bound of the Antipoverty Effects of SNAP
To estimate the effect of SNAP on poverty, I examine how supplementing income with SNAP
benefits affects the poverty headcount index, the poverty gap index, and the poverty severity
index. The poverty headcount is merely the proportion of the population that lives at or below
the poverty line. The poverty gap index, which measures the intensity of poverty, is defined as
the average distance between income and the poverty line among the poor as a proportion of the
poverty threshold. The severity index, or squared-poverty gap, which takes into account
inequality among the poor, is the weighted sum of poverty gaps as a proportion of the poverty
line.
These measurements of poverty are constructed on the basis of the widely known FGT
family of poverty indices, 𝑃! , and they can be expressed as:

𝑃! =

1
𝑛

𝐼(𝑦! − 𝑧) 𝑧 − 𝑦!

𝑧

!

where 𝑛 is the sample size, 𝑖 subscripts the individual or household, 𝑦 is the total annual
household income of the respective individual or household, 𝑧 is the poverty cutoff threshold
appropriate for the given individual or household used for estimating the OPM, and 𝐼 is an
indicator function that takes the value of one if true and zero if not. When alpha is equal to zero,
the FGT measure represents the poverty headcount; when alpha is one, it reflects the poverty
gap index; when alpha is two, it becomes the poverty severity index. All poverty measures can
be computed for each of the years in question, from 2012 to 2016.
Using the FGT family of poverty indices as a framework, the impact of SNAP can be
analyzed by adjusting income so that it accounts for the SNAP benefits, which can be written as:

𝑃!! =

1
𝑛

𝐼 𝑦! + 𝑓𝑠𝑏! − 𝑧

𝑧 − 𝑦! + 𝑓𝑠𝑏!

𝑧

!

Thus, depending on the assumptions adopted for the construction of 𝑓𝑠𝑏! (the total amount of
benefits received by the household), the relative antipoverty impact of SNAP can be estimated
as:
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𝑋=

𝑃!! − 𝑃!
𝑃!

For the estimation of what I define as the lower bound impact SNAP on poverty, 𝑓𝑠𝑏! is
given by the self-reported value of how much the household received in SNAP benefits in the
last year. Information on SNAP from the CPS-ASEC come from the answers respondents
provide to the following questions asked in the interview process as they appeared for the year
2016:
1. Did (you/anyone in this household) get food stamps or use a food stamp benefit card at
any time during 2016?
2. At any time during 2016, even for one month, did (you/ anyone in this household)
receive any food assistance from (state program name)?
3. Which of the people now living here were covered by that food assistance during 2016
If the respondent indicated that at least one member of the household did receive SNAP benefits
at some point during the past calendar year, and thus the household can be identified as a SNAP
household, the respondent is presented with three additional questions that deal with the amount
of SNAP benefits received and the duration of participation in the program:
4. What is the easiest way for you to tell us the value of the food assistance: monthly or
yearly?
5. What is the (monthly) value of the food assistance received in 2016?
6. How many months was food assistance received in 2016?
If respondents are unsure of the precise benefit amount or choose not to answer, they are asked
to determine whether the amount of benefits received falls into one of three possible ranges.
Finally, the respondents are asked to confirm the total annual SNAP benefit amount, which is
recorded as an integer value. (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).
Using the provided SNAP data and accepting the amount at face value, the SNAPinclusive FGT measures, 𝑃!! , are computed the same way as above, with the exception that the
self-reported total market value of the SNAP benefits received by the household in the previous
calendar year as recorded in the CPS-ASEC are added to total annual household income:
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𝐼 𝑦! + 𝑓𝑠𝑏! − 𝑧

𝑧 − 𝑦! + 𝑓𝑠𝑏!

𝑧
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Again, the equation is the same as before, the only difference being that 𝑓𝑠𝑏! represents the selfreported total market value of the SNAP benefits received by the household in the previous
calendar year as recorded in the CPS-ASEC. By comparing the poverty metrics with and
without SNAP benefits for all years under investigation, I calculate the resulting percentage
change in poverty:

𝑃! − 𝑃!!

𝑃! × 100. In doing so, I arrive at a lower bound estimation of

how accounting for SNAP reduces poverty as measured by the various FGT poverty metrics.
The Census Bureau calculates and publishes the impact of including SNAP benefits in
household income on the incidence of poverty, as measured by the official poverty thresholds.
These estimates serve as useful points of comparison in the analysis. For instance, in 2016 the
official poverty rate of 12.7 percent fell to 11.8 after accounting for SNAP benefits and from
13.5 to 12.5 in 2015 (Semega et al. 2017).
4.2.2 Estimation of the Upper Bound of the Antipoverty Effects of SNAP
While calculating the lower bound of the antipoverty effect of SNAP using self-reported
participation and benefit levels is relatively straightforward, arriving at the upper bound
involves additional procedures. The estimation of the upper bound of the antipoverty effect of
SNAP is divided into two stages: (1) identifying all SNAP-eligible households, and (2)
determining the SNAP allotment for each SNAP-eligible household. The first step of identifying
which households are eligible for SNAP benefits can be ascertained by comparing the
respondents’ information to the SNAP eligibility standards. The second step of calculating an
approximation of the level of benefits a household should receive can be derived from the
formula used by the USDA to determine SNAP allotments. After identifying which households
are eligible and the amount of SNAP benefits they ought to receive, the upper bound of the
antipoverty effect of SNAP can be estimated the same way as before with more participants and
more accurate benefit allotments. Next, I overview federal SNAP eligibility criteria and the
process of calculating an assistance unit’s benefit allotment while also describing the
assumptions adopted in the implementation of these rules for constructing the upper bound
estimates.
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4.2.2.1 Eligibility Criteria: SNAP is a means-tested program. Thus, to be eligible to receive the
assistance that SNAP benefits provide, households must meet specific financial requirements, in
addition to some nonfinancial requirements. Of the financial requirements, there are three—two
income tests and a single asset test. For some individuals, the nonfinancial eligibility criteria
consisting of work requirements and citizenship requirements may apply (FNS 2018a; FNS
2017a). For the present research, I define a SNAP-eligible assistance unit as an individual living
in a household that passes both the net income and gross income tests
In regards to the first two financial requirements—the income tests—there is a gross
income requirement as well as a net income requirement. For each test, the SNAP household’s
resources must be at or below the specified threshold to be considered eligible to receive
benefits. To pass the gross income test, an applicant’s total family income (before any
deductions are made) must not be above 130 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.
However, SNAP households are exempt from this test if at least one member is at least 60 years
old or has a disability (FNS 2018c).
In this study, total household income is used as gross income, which reinforces the use
of one-family households so as to have a precise measure of household income. If monthly
household income is less than the monthly gross income limit stipulated by the federal poverty
guidelines for a household of a given family size, that household passes the gross income test.
Because household income is expressed in annual terms in the data, monthly income, defined as
annual income divided by 12, is used to determine SNAP eligibility, under the assumption that
the flow of income was constant across the year. Table A.1 in the appendix displays the values
of monthly gross income limits for FY 2016, which are updated annually for cost of living
adjustments and are also available for each year on the FNS website (FNS 2018b). The USDA
defines elderly individuals as being at least 60 years old and being disabled as receiving Social
Supplemental Income (SSI) (FNS, 2018d). Households in which the highest age of any
household member is greater than or equal to 60 are exempt from the gross income test and need
only pass the net income test. Households in which at least one person has a disability, which
are indicated by having a household family income from SSI that is greater than zero, are also
exempt from the gross income test and need only pass the net income test.
To pass the net income test, an applicant’s net income must not be above 100 percent of
the federal poverty guidelines. (The FY 2016 values for thresholds are provided in Table A.1
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located in the appendix.) In 2016, for instance, the poverty guideline for a family of four is
equal to an annual income of $24,300 (HHS 2016). An assistance unit’s net income is equal to
its gross income minus a series of deductions, which includes a standard deduction, an earnings
deduction, a dependent care deduction, a medical expenses deduction, a deduction for legally
owed child support payments, and an excess shelter expenses deduction.
The monthly standard deduction is uniform across the lower forty-eight states and varies
somewhat by family size (FNS 2018b). In 2016, for example, it was set at $155 for households
with one to three members and $168 for those with four, $197 for those with five, and $226 for
those with six and above. The standard deduction is slightly higher in Alaska and Hawaii. These
values are increased annually for inflation.
The earnings deduction is a twenty-percent deduction from labor market income.
Households can also deduct all dependent care expenses, medical expenses greater than $35 for
elderly members or those with a disability, and legally owed child support payments made to
nonhousehold members.
Lastly, should the cost of shelter—rent or mortgage payments, taxes on the home,
heating, electricity, water, and a basic fee for one telephone—exceed more than half a
household’s net income after applying any other deductions, that household can claim the
excess shelter costs deduction. Excess shelter expenses above half the household’s income after
all other potential deductions can be deducted. Although the monthly value of excess shelter
deduction is capped ($504 for the lower forty-eight states in 2016), SNAP households with at
least one member who is at least 60 years old or has a disability are exempt from the cap and
can deduct all shelter costs beyond half the household’s income after other deductions are
applied (FNS 2018c).
In this paper, the first step in calculating net income involves subtracted the monthly
standard deduction amount based on household size and state from monthly gross income,
followed by a further subtraction of twenty percent of the household’s twelve-month average of
income from pretax wages and salary over the previous year if the household’s earnings from
wages is greater than zero. Other sources of earned income are not included. The values of the
standard deduction are updated annually for inflation and are available on the USDA’s website
(FNS 2018b).
In this study, the housing deduction is available to those whose housing costs exceed
half of their income following the application of the standard and earnings deductions. The
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values for approximating a household’s housing costs for each year come from the fair market
rents database compiled by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. I use
nationwide weighted average housing costs based on the number of rooms (OPDR 2018). The
estimated number of rooms assigned to each household depends on the number of effective
adults in that household, which in turn is a function of household size and composition.
Adopting the same parameters used in the equivalence scales that are part of the SPM, I use 0.5
as the child proportion of an adult and an economies of scale factor of 0.7 (Meyer and Sullivan
2012). The amount of housing costs that can be deducted is capped and set by the USDA. These
values are increased annually for cost of living adjustments and are available on the FNS
website (FNS 2018b). Households exempt from the gross income test are also exempt from the
cap on the excess shelter deduction and can deduct the full cost of shelter from their gross
income. Households with a net income below the federal poverty guidelines after subtracting the
standard, earnings, and housing deductions (if applicable) for the stipulated household size pass
the net income test.
The final financial requirement a household must pass to be eligible to receive SNAP
benefits is the asset test. Because assets reflect a potential source of funds to obtain food, the
value of a household’s assets must be at or below a given threshold—$2,250. Households with
at least one person who is either elderly or has a disability are allowed a higher threshold of
countable resources—$3,250. Notably, some important assets do not count towards countable
resources, such as a house and most retirement plans. In a related vein, the value of vehicles is
often excluded from the resources that make up the value of a household’s assets (FNS 2018c).
Certain eligibility criteria are omitted from the analysis due to data availability. The
asset test, for example, is not incorporated into this estimation because there is little information
regarding assets of households in the CPS data. Countable assets like deposits in bank accounts,
however, can likely be safely excluded for most households. The asset test is not included
because, even in 2016, many Americans (40 percent) say that they would not be able to cover an
emergency expense of $400 without selling something or borrowing money (Federal Reserve
2017). The percent of adults ill-prepared for unexpected hardship has decreased from 50 percent
since 2013 when the question was first asked (Federal Reserve 2017). SNAP-eligible
households by definition are either poor or have low incomes and should be expected to be even
less likely to have countable assets over the $2,250 (or $3,250 depending on age) asset limit.
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Besides, currently 32 states exclude the value of all vehicles entirely from the asset test,
and 21 states exclude the value of at least one vehicle per household (FNS 2018c). Furthermore,
34 percent of SNAP participants report traveling to grocery shop by either using someone else’s
car, riding with someone else, using public transportation, walking, or biking, which suggests
that many SNAP households may not own a vehicle (Oliveria, Prell, and Tiehen 2018).
Likewise, the previously mentioned dependent care, medical expense, and child support
deductions are similarly ignored because they are claimed by a fairly small shares of all SNAP
households claim them. It is estimated that in 2016 only 4 percent claimed the dependent care
deduction, 2 percent claimed the medical expense deduction, and 5 percent claimed the child
support deduction (CBPP 2018). The excess shelter cost deduction, on the other hand, was
implemented in the analysis because it was claimed by 68 percent of all SNAP households the
same year (CBPP 2018).
Finally, there are nonfinancial requirements for some recipients, some of which are work
related and some of which depend on the citizenship status of the applicant. In regards to the
general work requirements, continued participation in the program beyond three months in three
years for adults between the age of 16 and 59 is conditional on registering for work, accepting
employment if offered a position, and not voluntarily leaving a job or reducing work hours. The
work requirements do not apply to those physically or mentally unfit for employment, those in
school, or those responsible for the care of a child or incapacitated household member. There is
also an additional limit on the number of months one is eligible to receive SNAP benefits
imposed on working-age adults between the age of 18 and 49 that have no dependents—socalled able-bodied adults without dependents, or ABAWD for short. Unlike other SNAP
beneficiaries, unless they work or participate in a job-training program at least twenty hours per
week, ABAWDs can only receive benefits for 3 months out of any 36-month period (FNS,
2018a). In times of high unemployment, states can waive this three-month cap on receiving
benefits (Oliveria, 2018b). Because most SNAP participants are exempt from the work
requirements or already are working, the subgroup of the population subject the ABAWD time
limit is relatively small, estimated at 2 percent of the SNAP caseload (Bolen et al. 2016). As
such, the work requirement is excluded from this analysis.
In regards to noncitizen eligibility requirements, while undocumented noncitizens are
not eligible to receive SNAP benefits, lawful permanent noncitizens are eligible for SNAP
depending on residency and work history, age, and military service (FNS 2017a). Lawful
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permanent noncitizens are eligible if they have lived and worked in the United States for at least
five years. Lawful permanent noncitizens are also eligible for benefits if they are under the
children under the age of 18. Lastly, lawful noncitizens are eligible if they are members of the
U.S. Armed Forces, veterans, or dependents or a service member or veteran (Oliveria, 2018a).
In this study, only those are who are citizens or lawfully present noncitizens whose year since
coming to say in the U.S. is greater than five years from the year in question or are younger than
eighteen are considered to be possibly eligible for SNAP.
4.2.2.2 Benefit Formula: Three variables collectively determine the level of benefits a SNAP
household of a given family size receives: the maximum benefit amount, the benefit reduction
rate, and the household’s net income. The basis for the maximum benefit allotment comes from
the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP), a food budget designed by the USDA that is sufficient to purchase
a low-cost, nutritionally adequate diet. The TFP is calculated using a reference family of two
adults and two children and then adjusted in accordance with family size. To put it another way,
there is a different maximum monthly benefit for each household size. The maximum benefit is
set at specific amounts for all households with eight or fewer members. When household size is
above eight, the maximum benefit increases by a fixed amount for each additional member. (For
an example of one year, FY 2016, see Table A.2 located in the appendix). The benefit reduction
rate, which has long been 0.30, is a parameter that can be interpreted as the portion of net
income that a household is expected to contribute toward its food item purchases, assuming that
net income is greater than zero. Net income, again, is a household’s gross income after
subtracting a series of deductions.
The SNAP allotment, meaning the monthly amount of benefits received, 𝐴, is thus
determined by subtracting 30 percent of monthly net income from the maximum monthly
benefit, 𝑇𝐹𝑃, representing 100 percent of the TFP and enough money to cover the entire
expense of a low-cost, nutritionally adequate diet of a SNAP household of a given household
size:
𝐴 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃 − (0.3 × 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
A household with very little or no income—that is, a household with a zero or negative
net income—qualifies to receive the maximum benefit, which is equal to the full TFP amount.
The level of benefits is inversely related to income, and the poorest SNAP households,
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therefore, receive the largest benefits. It is estimated that 30 percent of SNAP units receive the
maximum benefit (Caswell and Yaktine 2013). Although benefits vary by the size of the
household and are updated annually by the Consumer Price Index, they are fixed across the
lower forty-eight states and the District of Columbia (higher in Alaska and Hawaii).
The maximum monthly benefit allotments based on the USDA TFP increase with
household size. Table A.1 shows the different values for FY 2016 by household size and
geography, which can also be found on the FNS website (FNS 2018b). These maximum
monthly benefit values increase annually for cost of living adjustments and are uniform across
the contiguous U.S. but are slightly higher for those in Alaska and Hawaii. Because the values
for the maximum monthly benefit for each year by all family sizes are available, the benefit
reduction rate parameter is given, and I have already developed a way to estimate a household’s
net income, I can easily approximate each household’s SNAP allotment by subtracting the
product of 0.3 and monthly household net income from the maximum monthly benefit. SNAPeligible households with net incomes below the minimum benefit automatically receive the
minimum benefit. Table A.1 located in the appendix shows the minimum benefit for FY 2016.
Additional values can be found on the FNS website for all years. By assuming that all SNAP
recipients participate in the program for the full year, the annual amount of SNAP benefits can
be calculated for each family by multiplying by twelve. In reality, not all SNAP recipients
participate in the program for the entire year, so this assumption will overstate the total amount
of benefits distributed. That said, the estimates are intended to serve as an upper bound to
encompass the full range of SNAP’s antipoverty effects. Additional assumptions required are
full participation—all SNAP-eligible individuals are selected and enrolled in the program—all
recipients claim the available deductions for which they are eligible.

5 RESULTS
The presentation of the results of this study is divided into three sections. In addition to
exploring the extent of underreporting in the CPS data to show how seriously the lower bound
estimates understate SNAP’s antipoverty impact, the first section evaluates the procedure
implemented to generate the upper bound estimates under full participation in the program. The
second section entails an analysis on the poverty trends over the five years in question and
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describes the lower and upper bound impacts of accounting for SNAP benefits on the FGT
poverty estimates among the general population. The analysis in the final section is broken
down into separate discussions of the results according to specific demographic characteristics,
namely, age, race and ethnicity, and family work status.
5.1 Assessment of Procedure
The procedure for identifying SNAP eligibility and calculating benefit allotments appears to
hold reasonably well. A close examination of and comparison between the survey data,
administrative records, and the constructed estimates of this study can help indicate whether the
estimates generated here are consistent with what one would expect under full participation in
the program. The administrative data published by the Food and Nutrition Service on actual the
average monthly participation, the total amount of benefits redeemed, and the average per capita
monthly benefit serve as useful benchmarks against which the reported lower bound and
constructed upper bound can be compared (Gray and Cunnygnyham 2017).
Information on each year from 2012 to 2015 is provided in A.3 of the appendix. (The
report including data on the FY 2016 is not currently available.) However, this section illustrates
the validity of the procedure by focusing on only one year (2015) because the patterns are
similar across years. The administrative data published by the Food and Nutrition Service on the
USDA website differ from administrative data in the official report on SNAP participation
because participation and benefits that fall under categories like disaster assistance are excluded
from the official report (Gray and Cunnygnyham 2017). In addition, while reported and
constructed estimates based on the CPS-ASEC data are for calendar years, the administrative
data provided are for the fiscal years. Consequently, the data are not directly comparable strictly
speaking. Though they do not allow for a perfect comparison, they do provide the best available
point of reference.
Table 1 displays important facts regarding participation levels and benefit amounts as
found in the CPS-ASEC data and administrative records for 2015. Table 1 includes reported
SNAP participation and benefit variables (the purely reported as well as the semi-reported
variable used for measuring the SPM), administrative records from the official report on SNAP
participation, and upper bound estimates constructed here using the CPS-ASEC data under
conditions of full participation. As mentioned earlier, the SPM incorporates SNAP benefits into
the measure of resources and the SNAP benefit variable used for the SPM is calculated slightly
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differently than the purely self-reported values for the food stamp variable because they attempt
to correct for underreporting.3 It provides another useful point of referencing when comparing
different the values of different data sources. In short, reported participation and benefit
amounts are much lower in the CPS-ASEC than in administrative records—especially so with
benefit amounts. Meanwhile, constructed estimates of participation levels and benefit amounts
under full participation using the procedure based on CPS-ASEC data look to be sufficiently
higher than administrative participation records.
Table 1. SNAP Participation and Benefits According to Different Data Sources: Survey
Information, Administrative Records, and Constructed Estimates, 2015
2015
Reported
Administrative
Constructed
Average Individual
Participation
(thousands)
Average Individual
Benefit ($)
Total Benefits
($ millions)

Food Stamp

SPM SNAP

Participating

Eligible

Estimated

34,222

38,260

41,554

50,036

50,965

89.36

88.63

129.49

110.97

33,353

34,655

64,571

66,540

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC and Gray and Cunnyngham 2016.
Notes: Participation and benefit totals in the official participation report differ from participation levels and total
benefits redeemed on the USDA Food and Nutrition Service website because certain individuals and spending (e.g.,
disaster assistance) are excluded from the figures in the report.

The first notable fact is that the CPS-ASEC data does not reflect many actual SNAP
participants, and it fails to capture an even more substantial share of the actual amount of
benefits redeemed. Far fewer individuals indicate participating in SNAP in survey data than is
the case according to administrative records. Based on information from survey respondents,
34.2 million participated in 2015. By contrast, 41.6 million actually received benefits in
administrative data. And although the variable for the SPM was an improvement, using that
metric still understates participation. When considering total expenditure on benefits, the
disparity between reported and administrative totals is even more pronounced. In 2015, for
instance, aggregate SNAP benefits reported in the CPS-ASEC were $33.4 billion, accounting
3

In the past, the Census Bureau has imputed SNAP receipt following a decline in reporting resulting from a change
in the questions used for the 2011 CPS-ASEC. Using a Monte Carlo method, food stamps were assigned to
households based on reporting receiving SNAP in the previous year and participation in other means-tested
programs. For more details, see Short (2011).
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for only 52 percent of the actual $64.5 billion in benefits paid according to administrative
records. One can also see the same feature of the data by observing the differences between the
average individual monthly benefits. The average individual monthly benefit based on reported
information in the CPS-ASEC was $89.36 in 2015, whereas administrative records reveal that
the average per capita benefit was truly $129.49. Thus, after examining the extent to which
SNAP participation and benefits are underreported in the survey data, it is evident that estimates
of SNAP’s antipoverty effects derived from self-reported participation and the face value of
benefits received according to respondents will considerably understate SNAP’s antipoverty
impacts.
Turning now to the constructed upper bound estimates, the number of SNAP-eligible
individuals estimated using the procedure is fairly commensurate with the official number of
SNAP-eligible individuals found in the participation report. The estimated number of
individuals identified as SNAP-eligible from data using the procedure is 51 million. As for the
administrative approximation, the estimated number of individuals eligible for SNAP is 50
million (Gray and Cunnyngham 2017). This similarity suggests that the procedure for
determining SNAP eligibility and benefit allotments produces reasonable estimates.
Total SNAP benefits assigned by the procedure are $66.5 billion, $2 billion greater than
the total benefits paid according to the administrative participation records. The increase in
participants is proportionately higher than the increase in benefits. The answer to this lies in the
relationship between participation and income. The participation rates in SNAP among
individuals living in households with lower incomes are greater than participation rates among
individuals living in households with higher incomes. In 2015, for instance, the participation
rate for those with gross incomes between 51 and 100 percent of the poverty guidelines was 91
percent. Yet the participation rate for those with gross incomes greater than 100 percent of the
poverty guidelines was merely 40 percent (Gray and Cunnygnyham 2017). Thus SNAP-eligible
nonparticipants tend to have higher incomes than those who participate, and because SNAP
benefits are inversely related to income, the higher incomes these individuals possess mean they
will be eligible for lower benefits than the typical participant. As a result, the increase in the
total expenditure on the program under full participation should be disproportionately small
relative to the increase in participation.
This characteristic is reflected in Table 1 with the difference between the average
individual benefit between participants from administrative records and those from the
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constructed upper bound, full participation estimates. In 2015 the average individual benefit of
participants was $129.49, and the average individual benefit estimated for the upper bound falls
to $110.97 with the inclusion of SNAP-eligible nonparticipants under full participation.
Moreover, others have identified a trend of hitting the target for the number of units with SNAP
but falling somewhat short of the target for total benefit dollars. Wheaton and Tran (2018) fall 8
percent short of administrative totals when correcting for underreporting and propose that it is
likely driven by the underlying characteristics of the CPS-ASEC data.
Investigating the distribution of benefits among the different data sources supplies
further evidence that illustrates the understated nature of the lower bound estimates and supports
the soundness of the estimation procedure used for constructing the upper bound estimates.
Table 2 displays information on monthly benefits received by individuals as expressed as a
percentage of the maximum monthly benefit. The breakdown is represented in terms of the
number of individuals and percent of the SNAP caseload that fall into different ranges of
benefits received. Three main categories are used (low, high, and maximum benefits).
Individuals receiving monthly benefits falling anywhere between zero and 50 percent of their
potential maximum monthly benefit are considered to be in the low benefit group. Those in the
high benefit group are defined as receiving anywhere between 50 percent and the maximum
monthly benefit. A final group is exclusively for those receiving the entire monthly maximum
benefit. In addition, the low and high benefit categories are further divided into two
subcategories.
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Table 2. The Distribution of SNAP Benefits as a Percentage of the Maximum Monthly
Benefit According to Different Data Sources: Survey Information, Administrative
Records, and Constructed Estimates, 2015
Reported

Low
Benefits
Greater
than 0 to
25
Greater
than 25 to
50
High
Benefits
Greater
than 50 to
75
Greater
than 75 to
maximum
Maximum
Benefit
Total

Administrative

Food Stamp
(thousands) (%)

SPM SNAP
(thousands)

(%)

Participating
(thousands)

(%)

Estimated
(thousands)

(%)

17,463

51.0

19,648

53.3

9,252

22.3

17,420

34.6

7,030

20.5

7,653

20.0

3,352

8.1

8,205

16.1

10,432

30.5

11,995

31.3

5.900

14.2

9,215

18.5

14,113

41.3

15,800

41.3

17,662

42.5

18,783

37.4

8,618

25.2

9,750

25.5

8,203

19.7

9,787

19.4

5,496

16.1

6,050

15.8

9,459

22.8

8,995

18.0

2,646

7.7

2,830

7.4

14,640

35.2

14,105

28.0

34,222

38,278

41,554

50,965

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC and Gray and Cunnyngham. 2016.
Notes: The first column under each data source lists the number of individuals receiving monthly benefits that fall
into the specified brackets of low, high, and maximum, expressed as a percentage of the maximum monthly benefit.
The second column under each data source lists the share of the caseload that falls into the specified benefit
brackets. The low and high benefit ranges are each further divided into two subcategories.

It is apparent that the number of individuals reporting receiving low benefits in the CPS
is higher than the number receiving low benefits in the administrative records on participation.
Moreover, the number of individuals reporting receiving high benefits is lower than
administrative participation records, especially in regards to the number of people receiving the
maximum benefit. This shift in the distribution from primarily low benefits in the survey data to
primarily high benefits in the participation records suggests that not only are households failing
to report SNAP receipt, even the ones that do substantially understate the level of benefits they
receive. Information from respondents indicates that the number reported having received low
benefits was 17.5 million in 2015. But administrative records tell a very different story: they
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show that in reality, only 9.3 million received what are considered low benefits. This means in
2015 8.2 million more individuals stated receiving low benefits than was actually the case. It is
very likely that these individuals underreported the benefit amounts, particularly given that the
opposite relationship exists for the number receiving high benefits and the maximum benefit.
Using the information from reported data, the number of individuals receiving high benefits is
lower than the number according to administrative records—3.6 million fewer individuals
reported receiving high benefits than administrative data show. The discrepancy is much more
dramatic among the reported number receiving the maximum benefit: while administrative data
reveal that 14.6 million individuals received the maximum benefit, a mere 2.6 million reported
such, which suggests that households underreport their benefit amounts in addition to their
participation.
Shifting now to the estimates constructed here for the upper bound, they resemble fairly
closely what one would expect. The estimated number of people eligible to receive the
maximum benefit under full participation in the program is much closer—albeit slightly lower
(0.5 million)—than the number of people actually receiving the maximum benefit as recorded
the administrative records in 2015. However, the participation rate among those receiving the
maximum allotment is estimated at 99 percent in 2015. Thus the administrative records
represent essentially all individuals eligible for the maximum benefit. An additional explanation
for this is that not every deduction is included in the analysis. Had all deductions been
implemented, it is likely that the estimated number of individuals eligible to receive the
maximum monthly allotment would be higher. The number of individuals receiving low benefits
increasing considerably compared to administrative participation records, but this shift in the
distribution of the SNAP caseload to low benefits is to be expected as per the above discussion
on the decline in the average monthly benefit received. In summary, the evidence suggests that
this procedure for determining SNAP eligibility and benefit allotments seems to produce
reasonable estimates.
5.2 Overall Poverty Trends and General Population
The first noteworthy fact that emerges after examination of the trends of the poverty metrics is
that they all exhibit decreasing trends across time over the five-year period. Figures 2 through 4
illustrate one of the three FGT poverty indices without SNAP benefits, after including reported
SNAP benefits in income, and after including SNAP benefits in income under full participation
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for each year from 2012 to 2016. Figures 2 through 4 demonstrate that all three of the FGT
indices fell during the five years analyzed. Table 1 displays some of the same information in a
different format, presenting the poverty indices with and without SNAP for each year from 2012
to 2016, as well as the percent reduction in each of the poverty estimates using the poverty
measurements absent SNAP as the baseline. Overall, the poverty headcount, gap, and severity
indices decreased by 2.24 points, 0.81 points, and 0.48 points, respectively, between 2012 and
2016. This pattern coincides with the continual improvement of the economy and the
corresponding decline in the SNAP caseload in 2013 following a decade of gradually increasing
participation since 2000 and a sudden influx with the onset of the most recent recession (Figure
1).
Figure 2. Poverty and SNAP Benefits: Annual Headcount Index, 2012–16
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
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Figure 3. Poverty and SNAP Benefits: Annual Gap Index, 2012–16
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.

Figure 4. Poverty and SNAP Benefits: Annual Severity Index, 2012–16
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Table 3. Poverty and SNAP Benefits: Without SNAP, Lower Bound, and Upper Bound,
2012–16
Year
2012
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
2013
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
2014
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
2015
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
2016
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Mean
Without
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound

Headcount Index

Poverty Gap Index

Poverty Severity Index

SNAP

SNAP

SNAP

Reduction
(%)

14.10

Reduction
(%)

6.70

Reduction
(%)

4.63

12.91

8.4

5.54

17.3

3.61

21.9

10.29

27.0

3.55

47.0

1.96

57.7

13.58

6.39

4.44

12.49

8.0

5.34

16.4

3.52

20.7

9.91

27.0

3.49

45.4

1.97

55.6

13.88

6.69

4.74

12.75

8.1

5.66

15.3

3.82

19.4

10.66

23.2

3.89

41.9

2.25

52.4

12.71

6.10

4.29

11.73

7.7

5.18

15.1

3.49

18.5

9.60

24.5

3.49

42.8

2.03

52.6

11.86

5.81

4.15

11.03

7.0

5.00

14.3

3.42

17.6

9.00

24.1

3.41

41.3

2.03

51.0

13.23

6.34

4.45

12.18

7.8

5.34

15.7

3.57

19.6

9.89

25.2

3.57

43.7

2.05

53.9

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: All poverty indices are multiplied by100. The first column under each poverty index lists the poverty
estimates with or without SNAP benefits added to income. The second column under each poverty index lists the
percent decline in each poverty index after accounting for SNAP benefits.
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The exception to this otherwise steady decline in poverty is the year 2014 when each
FGT index experienced a slight uptick. The most likely explanation for the increase in all the
poverty indices is the policy decision that went into effect November 2013, which sharply cut
$5 billion in SNAP assistance. Beginning in FY 2014, benefits were reduced for nearly all 46.6
million SNAP recipients after the temporary 13.6 percent boost in the TFP used as the basis for
all maximum monthly benefits implemented during the most recent recession came to an abrupt
end as Congress restored benefits to 2009 levels, adjusted for inflation (Dean and Rosenbaum
2013). For a family of three, this cut translated to a decrease in benefits of $29 per month (Dean
and Rosenbaum 2013). Given that SNAP recipient families have extremely inflexible budgets,
and in light of recent research indicating that poor and low-income families cannot absorb more
than a $3 reduction of benefits per child per week, the benefit cuts undoubtedly had negative
consequences on the economic well-being of SNAP households at that time (Almada and
McCarthy 2017).
After comparing the extent to which the poverty metrics decline following the inclusion
of SNAP benefits, it is clear that the reductions are larger for the two distribution-sensitive
indices relative to the simple headcount index. For example, the average lower bound reduction
in the poverty rate after accounting for SNAP benefits was 7.8 percent. By contrast, the average
lower bound reductions in the poverty gap and severity indices were 15.7 and 19.6 percent,
respectively. The same relationship holds when observing the upper bound effect of accounting
for SNAP benefits on decreasing poverty estimates. The average upper bound reduction in the
poverty rate was 25.2 percent, whereas the average reductions in the poverty gap and severity
indices were 43.7 and 53.9 percent, respectively. These results are consistent with the findings
of earlier studies and provide further support for the well-established relationship that SNAP
benefits have a greater impact on alleviating the depth and severity of poverty compared to the
incidence of poverty (Jolliffe et al. 2005; Tiehen et al. 2012; Tiehen et al. 2016).
Another significant point is that the upper bound effect of SNAP on each FGT poverty
index is considerably larger than its lower bound counterpart. For instance, the lower bound
effect of accounting for SNAP on the poverty rate was on average a reduction of 7.8 percent, but
the upper bound effect was on average a reduction of 25.2 percent. The same is the case with
both the poverty gap and severity indices. The lower bound effect of SNAP on the gap index
was a 15.7 percent decline on average, but for the upper bound it was a 43.7 percent decline on
average. Lastly, the average lower bound effect of SNAP on the severity index was 19.6
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percent, whereas the average upper bound effect was 53.9 percent. The reason for this pattern
across all the FGT indices is certainly a combination of (1) the greater number of individuals
receiving SNAP benefits and (2) the higher average benefits for all participants, both of which
result naturally from using the constructed estimates for full participation rather than the
estimates based on reported values.
Another way of understanding the impact of factoring SNAP benefits on poverty
estimates is to analyze the effects in including the value of SNAP benefits on the poverty gap in
dollar amounts. Table 4 presents data on the gross and average poverty gap for each year
between 2012 and 2016 without SNAP benefits, counting reported benefits towards income, and
accounting for SNAP benefits under full participation in the program. The gross poverty gap
from 2012 to 2016 was $127.6 billion on average, and after incorporating the lower bound value
of reported SNAP benefits into income, the gross poverty gap is reduced to $107.6 billion, a
drop of $20.0 billion. The average poverty gap excluding reported SNAP benefits during this
same time was $8,030, meaning that the typical poor family would have needed that amount to
be lifted above the poverty level. Among poor recipient families that receive SNAP, adding the
value of reported benefits reduced this average poverty gap to $6,776. As before, this
comparison substantially understates the potential antipoverty effects of SNAP. For instance, the
total poverty gap would have been $72.9 billion on average from 2012 to 2016 under conditions
of full participation in SNAP, leading to a $54.8 billion reduction of the total poverty gap on
average from 2012 to 2016. Among families that remain poor in spite of the assistance SNAP
provides, accounting for the upper bound effects of SNAP benefits would have resulted in an
estimated average poverty gap to $4,588 from 2012 to 2016.
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Table 4. Gross and Average Poverty Gap without SNAP, Lower Bound, and Upper Bound,
2012–16
Poverty Gap
Year
2012
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2013
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2014
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2015
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2016
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Mean
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Gross
($ millions)

Average
($)

128,294
106,037
68,974

7,954
6,574
4,276

125,970
105,382
69,368

7,749
6,482
4,267

136,516
115,611
80,324

8,147
6,899
4,793

125,060
106,250
72,679

8,083
6,868
4,698

122,370
105,027
72,998

8,219
7,054
4,903

127,642
107,661
72,869

8,030
6,776
4,536

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: The first column under Poverty Gap lists the value of the total poverty gap with and without accounting for
SNAP benefits for each year. The second column lists the average poverty gap with and without accounting for
SNAP benefits for each year.

Furthermore, it is useful to note the likeness (or lack thereof) of the results from the
present study to that in other recent studies. When considering the lower bound effects of
accounting for SNAP found here for 2012 and comparing them with those found by Tiehen,
Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) for 2011, the estimates are certainly similar. Even though they are
estimates for two separate years, the pairing represents the best available selection for
comparison. Using reported participation and benefits, for 2011, Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding
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find reductions in the poverty headcount, gap, and severity indices of 8.0, 15.1, and 19.0
percent, respectively (Figure 2.7). Meanwhile, for 2012, the estimated lower bound reductions
in the poverty headcount, gap, and severity indices found in the present study are 8.4, 20.9, and
21.9 percent, respectively (Table 1). The fact that the lower bound effects resemble fairly
closely the findings of previous research further substantiates the present results.
In a related vein, the percent declines in the poverty gap and severity indices in 2011
with corrections for underreporting reflecting actual participation and benefits redeemed as
found by Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) are quite commensurate to the upper bound
estimates of the antipoverty effects of SNAP on the poverty gap and severity indices found in
the present study for the year 2012 under conditions of full participation. For 2011, Tiehen,
Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) calculate decreases in the poverty gap and severity of 40.7 and
54.4 percent, respectively, which are not far off from the estimated upper bound decreases in the
same indices of 47.0 and 57.7 percent found here for 2012 under full participation. The fact that
the antipoverty effects of SNAP on the poverty gap and severity indices with actual
participation are near those under full participation suggests that SNAP is currently close to
achieving its full potential regarding alleviating the depth and severity of poverty. This also
supports recent work by Wheaton and Tran (2018) who also conclude that SNAP has already
achieved much of its antipoverty potential in regards to the poverty gap and poverty severity.
Conversely, there is a considerable difference between the percent decline in the poverty
rate after correcting for underreporting to reflect actual participation and the estimated percent
decline under full participation. Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016) find a 15.9 percent
decline in poverty after correcting for underreporting for 2011, whereas the upper bound decline
in the poverty rate for 2012 found in the present study is 25.2 percent. This disparity implies that
the program currently has unrealized potential to reduce the poverty rate further. This
conclusion is consistent with the findings of other recent studies. Wheaton and Tran (2018)
estimate that SNAP was responsible for 8.4 million fewer people being considered as living in
poverty for 2015 after correcting for underreporting, and with full participation, they estimate an
additional 1 million more would have been included. Thus, full participation would have
resulted in a total antipoverty effect of 9.4 million individuals, which is comparable to the
estimated upper bound effect on the poverty rate for 2015 of 9.3 million individuals concerning
the number of fewer people being counted as poor (Table 5). Similarly, Sherman and Trisi
(2015) find that accounting for SNAP benefits and correcting for underreporting resulted in 10.3
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million fewer people being considered as living in poverty in 2012. Their results are consistent
with the estimated upper bound effect found here of 11.1 million possible individuals that could
have been lifted from poverty that same year with full participation in the program. As will be
expanded upon shortly in the following section, there are reasons to believe the reduction in the
poverty rate would be driven increased participation among the elderly.
Table 5. People in Poverty: Without SNAP, Lower Bound, and Upper Bound, 2012–16
People in Poverty

Reduction in Poverty from SNAP

Total
(thousands)

Percent

Number
(thousands)

Percentage
Points

2012
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

41,186
37,707
30,058

14.10
12.91
10.29

3,479
11,128

1.19
3.81

2013
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

40,068
36,849
29,247

13.58
12.49
9.91

3,219
10,821

1.09
3.67

2014
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

41,362
38,015
31,760

13.88
12.75
10.66

3,347
9,602

1.13
3.22

2015
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

38,204
35,258
28,863

12.71
11.73
9.60

2,946
9,341

0.98
3.11

2016
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

35,687
33,176
27,092

11.86
11.03
9.00

2,512
8,595

0.83
2.86

Mean
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

39,301
36,201
29,404

13.23
12.18
9.89

3,100
9,897

1.04
3.33

Year

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: The first and second columns under People in Poverty list the number of individuals considered living in
poverty and the poverty rate before and after accounting for SNAP benefits, respectively, for each year. The first
and second columns under Reduction in Poverty from SNAP list the decrease in the number of people considered
living in poverty and the percentage point reduction in the poverty rate after accounting for SNAP benefits.
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5.3 Analysis of Specific Demographic Groups
From this point on, the analysis is done at the group-level among specific groups of interest,
namely by the work status of families, by race and ethnicity, and by age. Even though there is
some year-to-year variation in the data, I use averages over the 2012–2016 period to reflect the
central tendencies. The antipoverty impact of SNAP varies along these various dimensions and
observations are categorized in certain ways: children, nonelderly adults, and the elderly are all
considered separately; non-Hispanic whites are contrasted with non-Hispanic blacks and
Hispanics; working families are compared to nonworking families. The effect of including
SNAP benefits on the estimates of poverty varies considerably between some subgroups of the
population. The comparisons illustrate the differential impact that accounting for SNAP benefits
has on reducing the poverty estimates along these various dimensions. Table 6 presents the
share of SNAP-eligible individuals according to these different demographic characteristics.
(For a useful point of comparison, see Table A.4 for how large each group is relative to the total
population.) With this information, it is apparent how much each group relies on SNAP.
Table 6. Share of SNAP-Eligible Individuals by Demographic Characteristics, 2015
Group
Share of SNAP-Eligible Individuals
(%)
Age
Children
34.0
Nonelderly Adults
50.0
Elderly
16.0
Race and Ethnicity
White
42.0
Black
21.3
Hispanic
29.0
Other
7.6
Family Work Status
Individuals Living in Working Families
42.5
Individuals Living in Nonworking Families
57.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC and Gray and Cunnyngham. 2016.

5.2.1 Age: Children, Nonelderly Adults, and Elderly Adults
Separating individuals by age is useful because poverty varies significantly by age. It is a clear
that poverty is much more widespread, deeper, and more severe among children than it is among
adults (Table 7). Child poverty estimates as measured by the headcount, gap, and severity
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indices are all well above the average for the total population. However, the antipoverty effects
of SNAP on the depth and severity of child poverty are much greater than those on the total
population, irrespective of whether one examines the lower or upper bound. Poverty is the least
common and least acute, however, among elderly adults. Table 6 shows this, indicating how
children comprise more than a third of the SNAP-eligible population, in spite of the fact that
they represent less than a quarter of the general population on average (Table A.4).
Table 7. Poverty and SNAP Benefits by Age: Without SNAP, Lower Bound, and Upper
Bound, 2012–2016
Headcount Index

Poverty Gap Index

Poverty Severity Index

Year

SNAP

SNAP

SNAP

Children
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

19.60
17.85
14.96

Nonelderly
Adults
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Reduction
(%)

Reduction
(%)

Reduction
(%)

8.9
23.7

9.43
7.44
4.92

21.1
47.8

6.40
4.59
2.53

28.2
62.9

11.75
10.90
9.02

7.2
23.1

5.80
5.03
3.45

13.4
40.5

4.18
3.50
2.09

16.2
51.9

Elderly Adults
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

8.99
8.28
5.31

7.9
41.0

3.54
3.27
1.88

7.7
46.9

2.40
2.24
1.10

6.6
55.3

Total
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

13.23
12.18
9.89

7.8
25.2

6.34
5.34
3.57

15.7
43.7

4.45
3.57
2.05

19.6
53.9

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: All poverty indices are multiplied by100. The first column under each poverty index lists the poverty
estimates with or without SNAP benefits added to income. The second column under each poverty index lists the
percent decline in each poverty index after accounting for SNAP benefits.
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Figure 5 displays the average annual upper bound reduction in poverty estimates by age
among the general population, children, nonelderly adults, and elderly adults from 2012 to 2016.
In no subgroup is the effect of including the value of SNAP benefits on the rate of poverty
greater than among the elderly. The immense reduction in the poverty rate among the elderly
after accounting for the upper bound effects of SNAP reflects a large portion of the untapped
potential for further reductions in the poverty rate. There are several reasons why one would
expect the fall in the poverty rate from full participation to be driven primarily by elderly adults.
First and foremost, elderly adults have by far the lowest participation rates of any age group.
Whereas nonelderly adults had an estimated participation rate of 86 percent in FY 2015, elderly
adults participated in the program at a rate of just 42 percent that same year (Gray and
Cunnyngham 2017). In addition, as Table 7 shows, the elderly have the lowest average poverty
gap of all of the three age groups, meaning that they would require lower levels of benefits than
the average participant to be lifted above the poverty line. And yet, SNAP eligibility rules are
designed quite favorably towards seniors: as discussed earlier in this paper, not only are the
elderly the sole age group categorically exempt from the gross income test (meaning SNAPeligible elderly adults will be even closer to the poverty line), they are also the only age group
automatically exempt from the cap on the excess shelter deduction, allowing them to deduct
more expenses from gross income, lowering their net income, and ultimately yielding a higher
amount of benefits received compared to the typical nonelderly participant, all else equal. Thus,
the elderly demographic possesses much greater potential to experience reductions in the
poverty rate. All of these factors contribute to the dramatic reduction of poverty among the
elderly under conditions of full participation in SNAP. This also explains the dramatic reversal
of trends when comparing the lower and upper bound poverty effects of SNAP on the poverty
metrics among the elderly. Furthermore, Wheaton and Tran (2018) also conclude that full
participation in SNAP would result in the largest reductions in poverty among nonelderly adults.
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Figure 5. Average Annual Upper Bound Reductions in Poverty from SNAP by Age, 2012–
16

Percent Reduc5on in Poverty

70

62.9

60

53.9

50

47.8

43.7

55.3

51.9
46.9
40.5

41.0

40
30

25.2

23.7

23.1

20
10
0
Total

Children
Headcount Index

Non-Elderly Adults
Gap Index

Elderly Adults

Severity Index

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.

5.2.2 Race: non-Hispanic Whites, Non-Hispanic Blacks, Hispanics, and Other
Racial and ethnic minorities in the United States have historically been subject to discrimination
and marginalization (Pager and Shepherd 2008). As a result of ongoing intergenerational
impoverishment, members of racial and ethnic minorities experience poverty to a substantially
higher degree relative to the overall population. As Table 8 demonstrates, while the incidence of
poverty among non-Hispanic whites was on average 8.56 percent throughout 2012 to 2016, it
was 24.74 percent among non-Hispanic blacks, nearly a threefold increase. The pattern holds for
the poverty gap and severity indices as well. A similar situation is true for the Hispanic
subgroup, and somewhat less so for all remaining racial and ethnic groups. Furthermore, as
Table 6 reveals, racial and ethnic minorities make up a sizeable portion of the SNAP-eligible
population, one that is disproportionately larger than their share of the overall population.
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Table 8. Poverty and SNAP Benefits by Race and Ethnicity: Without SNAP, Lower
Bound, and Upper Bound, 2012–16

Year
Non-Hispanic
Whites
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Non-Hispanic
Blacks
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Hispanic
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Other
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Total
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Headcount Index

Poverty Gap Index

Poverty Severity Index

SNAP

SNAP

SNAP

8.56
7.90
6.41

Reduction
(%)

7.6
25.1

4.13
3.60
2.48

24.74
22.63
19.35

8.5
21.7

22.14
20.37
15.97

Reduction
(%)

Reduction
(%)

12.9
40.0

2.96
2.51
1.51

15.2
50.5

12.34
9.88
6.72

19.8
45.4

8.67
6.39
3.64

26.2
61.6

8.0
27.8

10.03
8.35
5.22

16.7
47.8

6.75
5.31
2.83

21.3
60.7

12.71
11.81
9.44

7.1
25.7

6.39
5.47
3.64

14.3
42.9

4.63
3.81
2.15

17.5
55.4

13.23
12.18
9.89

7.8
25.2

6.34
5.34
3.57

15.7
43.7

4.45
3.57
2.05

19.6
53.9

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: All poverty indices are multiplied by100. The first column under each poverty index lists the poverty
estimates with or without SNAP benefits added to income. The second column under each poverty index lists the
percent decline in each poverty index after accounting for SNAP benefits.

Figure 6 displays the average annual upper bound reduction in poverty estimates by race
and ethnicity among the general population, non-Hispanic whites, Non-Hispanic blacks,
Hispanics, and a category for all remaining subgroups from 2012 to 2016. In general, the
smallest impacts of factoring SNAP benefits on poverty estimates were among the non-Hispanic
white group, and the largest reductions in the poverty estimates after accounting for SNAP
benefits were found among racial and ethnic minorities. After accounting for the upper bound
effects of SNAP, the percent declines in the poverty indices for individuals non-Hispanic white
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group were all below average relative to the total population. Excluding the percent decline in
the poverty rate among non-Hispanic blacks (which was below average at 21.7 percent), the
percent reductions in all other poverty metrics were above or well above average.
Figure 6. Average Annual Upper Bound Reductions in Poverty from SNAP by Race and
Ethnicity, 2012–16

Percent Reduc5on in Poverty
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61.6

60
50
40
30

55.4

53.9
43.7

25.2

60.7

50.5
45.4

47.8
42.9

40.0

25.1

27.8
21.7

25.7

20
10
0
Total

Non-Hispanic
Whites
Headcount Index

Non-Hispanic
Blacks
Gap Index

Hispanic

Other

Severity Index

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.

Thus, the impact of counting SNAP benefits on poverty estimates is largest among the
non-Hispanic black and Hispanic groups, particularly when considering the depth and severity
of poverty. These findings are also corroborated by the recent work of Wheaton and Tran (2018)
who also observe that accounting for SNAP benefits substantially reduced the rate of poverty
and the rate of deep poverty for non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics. The impacts are the least
notable among the non-Hispanic white group, for whom they are somewhat lower than the
average of the total population. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the inclusion of the value
of SNAP benefits in the measure of poverty—whether the lower or the upper bound—does not
eliminate the differences in the rate, depth, and severity of poverty along dimensions of race and
ethnicity. But because the non-Hispanic black and Hispanic subgroups of the population face a
higher prevalence, depth, and severity of poverty, this shows that the program is effective at
both targeting those with higher needs and mitigating those differences in poverty.
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5.2.3 Working and Nonworking Families
In this section, families are dichotomized into a working family group and a nonworking family
group because, unsurprisingly, there are extreme differences in poverty between the two groups,
as measured by prevalence, depth, and severity. Table 9 illustrates the stark differences in
poverty without SNAP, with its lower bound antipoverty effects, and with its upper bound
antipoverty effects. The prevalence of poverty absent SNAP benefits among nonworking
families (28.75 percent) is more than twice that among the general population of families (13.37
percent), the same is the case with the depth of poverty and severity experienced by those
families as well. Moreover, as Table 6 shows, individuals living in nonworking families make
up the majority of the SNAP caseload, despite the number of working households outnumbering
nonworking households in the general population (Table A.4).
Table 9. Poverty and SNAP Benefits by Family Work Status (Household Level): Without
SNAP, Lower Bound, and Upper Bound, 2012–16

Group
Working
Families
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Nonworking
Families
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Total
Without
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Headcount Index

Poverty Gap Index

Poverty Severity Index

SNAP

SNAP

SNAP

7.65
6.92
5.27

Reduction
(%)

Reduction
(%)

9.5
30.9

3.13
2.60
1.73

28.75
27.03
22.74

6.0
20.9

15.04
13.27
9.32

11.8
38.1

11.53
9.88
5.85

13.37
12.37
10.01

7.5
25.1

6.36
5.50
3.78

13.6
40.5

4.54
3.80
2.28

Reduction
(%)

16.9
44.7

1.94
1.53
0.94

21.1
52.2

14.3
55.2

16.4
52.2

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: All poverty indices are multiplied by100. The first column under each poverty index lists the poverty
estimates with or without SNAP benefits added to income. The second column under each index poverty index lists
the percent decline in each poverty index after accounting for SNAP benefits.
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Administrative reports indicate that participation rates are quite lower among individuals
living in households with earned income relative to individuals living in households with no
earned income. For instance, in FY 2015, the participation rate for individuals living in
households with at least one working adult was 72 percent (Gray and Cunnyngham 2017). At
the same time, more or less all individuals living in households without at least one working
adult participated in the program that year. The lack of earnings means the net income of those
households will be very low—if not negative after deductions are applied—which will qualify
them for the maximum monthly benefit or very close to it. The participation rate was 98 percent
for those eligible for 51 to 99 percent of the maximum monthly benefit in FY 2015 (Gray and
Cunnyngham 2017).
This information helps explain the data displayed in Table 9. As is shown there, the
percent reduction in the poverty rate after accounting for SNAP benefits is greater for families
with at least one working adult that it is for families without at least one—and this is true
regardless if one looks at the lower or upper bound effects. One would initially expect the
decrease to be more substantial among the nonworking families. However, the fact of lower
participation among families with earned income coupled with the reality that nonworking
families have a substantially higher poverty gap index implies that the upper bound percent
reduction in the poverty rate should be greater for working families. Because SNAP would be
more effective at removing families with income, who will be closer to the poverty line, up to
the poverty than families without wage income. Interestingly, when comparing the upper bound
effects of SNAP among nonworking families with the total population, this differential shrinks
slightly with the gap index and disappears entirely with the upper bound estimate of the percent
reduction in the poverty severity index, as seen in Figure 7. The progressive benefit structure of
SNAP ensures that those with higher need receive greater benefits. These results also support
findings of Wheaton and Tran (2018) who observe that SNAP substantially reduces deep
poverty among families with a working adult, who for this reason correctly claim that SNAP is
an important income for the working poor.
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Figure 7. Average Annual Upper Bound Reductions in Poverty from SNAP by Family
Work Status (Households), 2012–16
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.

Also noteworthy is the contrast between the lower bound percent declines in the poverty
severity between the two groups. The percent decline for nonworking families is only faintly
higher than the decline in the poverty gap index, increasing to 14.3 from 11.8 percent. As
discussed earlier, the observations most heavily missing from the reported CPS-ASEC data
appear to be among the category receiving the maximum benefit. That helps explain the reversal
of the trend in the percent reduction of the poverty severity index between the two groups going
from the lower bound effect to the upper bound effect of SNAP.
Table 10 presents the distribution of hours usually worked per week at all jobs among
SNAP-eligible individuals who work for the year 2015. Regarding work requirements, it is
evident that a full 10 percent of working SNAP-eligible individuals typically work 20 hours per
week or fewer, and an additional 5 percent report having variable number of hours usually
worked per week. These segments of the SNAP-eligible population are the most susceptible to
potentially losing eligibility for benefits if work requirements are heightened or subject to a
wider array of recipients. Currently nondisabled SNAP recipients between the ages of 18 and 49
without dependents must work at least an average of 20 hours per week each month to continue
receiving benefits. It has been proposed that the age group this rule applies to be expanded to
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individuals between the ages of 18 to 59 as well as those not responsible for the care of a child
below 6. Moreover, although workers with an irregular number of hours worked may typically
exceed the work requirement, should they not work or have reduced hours one week of the
month, the average number of hours worked for the month can fall below the requirement and
thus rendering them ineligible for benefits.
Table 10. Distribution of Hours Usually Worked per Week at All Jobs among SNAPEligible Individuals Who Work, 2015
Percentile
Number of Hours Usually Worked
(%)
per Week at All Jobs
5
13
10
20
25
30
50
40
75
40
90
65
95
Irregular
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
Notes: Each row reflects the percentile of the distribution of hours usually worked per week at all jobs, with the
ninety-fifth percentile having reported working an irregular number of hours per week.

6 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study is based on the continuing effort to broaden and improve our
understanding of the antipoverty effects of SNAP. The purpose of has been to provide estimates
of the lower and upper bound effects of accounting for SNAP benefits on the poverty
headcount, gap, and severity indices from 2012 to 2016, thereby (1) extending previous research
by Tiehen, Jolliffe, and Smeeding (2016), providing the most recent update to their work, and
(2) contributing to the growing literature on the impact of SNAP on poverty under full
participation, illustrating the full range of the program’s potential to reduce and alleviate
poverty.
Accounting for SNAP benefits has a more substantial impact on the depth and severity
of poverty, whether considering the lower or the upper bound effects. In addition, the upper
bound antipoverty effects of SNAP under conditions of full participation are considerably larger
than those of the lower bound, which rely solely on reported participation and benefit amounts.
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In regards to age groups, children and the elderly experience larger declines in the poverty gap
and poverty severity indices than nonelderly adults, and the elderly experience the largest
percent reduction in the poverty rate. Concerning race and ethnicity, the non-Hispanic black and
Hispanic subgroups experience the most substantial decreases in the poverty gap and severity
indices, whereas the non-Hispanic white subgroup experiences a larger percent decline in the
headcount index than does the non-Hispanic black subgroup. Lastly, between working and
nonworking families, the percent decline in all the poverty metrics is more substantial among
working families than it is among nonworking families, except for the poverty severity index,
where they percent declines of the two groups are equal. Given the evident potential for
improvements in the poverty rate with higher levels of participation, researchers should consider
what measures would be effective in increasing enrollment among the subgroups least likely to
participate. Taking those actions would lead to additional reductions in the poverty rate.
Despite SNAP’s potential to lessen poverty among low-income Americans, the program
continues to be under a great deal of political pressure. In 2016, the House Committee on
Agriculture published a report in which work requirements received increasing attention. The
report argued that better enforcement of work requirements are necessary and ought to be
coupled with additional SNAP employment and training programs to facilitate the transition
from government assistance to work (House of Representatives 2016). In addition, although not
enacted, the FY 2018 budget proposal put forward by the administration included several drastic
changes to the program: the elimination of the minimum benefit for households of one or two
members, capping the maximum benefit at a household size of six, and essentially discontinuing
SNAP as an entitlement program—all of which, some have estimated, could have resulted in a
change of benefits for 23.4 million families, the average annual reduction of benefits being
approximately $600 per family (Waman and Gianarelli 2017).
Moreover, every five years or so, Congress passes a farm bill to appropriate spending on
many agricultural and food assistance programs like SNAP. With the expiration of the most
recent farm bill approaching this September, the 2018 farm bill is currently making its way
through the legislative process. One current form of legislation expands the group of people
subject to the time limit, raises the number of hours working or spent in job training per needed
to comply with the requirement, and includes stricter penalties for failing to conform to the
work requirement (Bolen et al. 2018).
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At a time when lawmakers are contemplating making cuts to the program and instituting
more stringent eligibility standards for receiving benefits, this research provides further
evidence supporting the argument that SNAP as currently designed is an important tool for
reducing the prevalence of poverty as well as alleviating its depth and severity, one with far
greater potential that is apparent based on reported participation and benefits.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1 Fiscal Year 2016 Federal SNAP Gross and Net Income Limits, by Household
Size and Geography
Gross Monthly Income ($)
Household Size
Contiguous United States
Alaska
Hawaii
1
1,276
1,595
1,468
2
1,726
2,158
1,986
3
2,177
2,722
2,504
4
2,628
3,285
3,022
5
3,078
3,848
3,540
6
3,529
4,412
4,058
7
3,980
4,975
4,575
8
4,430
5,538
5,093
Each additional member
+451
+564
+518
Net Monthly Income ($)
Household Size
Contiguous United States
Alaska
Hawaii
1
981
1,227
1,130
2
1,328
1,660
1,528
3
1,675
2,094
1,926
4
2,021
2,527
2,325
5
2,368
2,960
2,723
6
2,715
3,394
3,121
7
3,061
3,827
3,520
8
3,408
4,260
3,918
Each additional member
+347
+434
+399
Source: “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) Information,” Food and
Nutrition Service, last published April 3, 2018.

71

Table A.2 Fiscal Year 2016 Maximum and Minimum Monthly SNAP Benefit Amounts, by
Household Size and Geography
Maximum Monthly Benefit ($)
Household Size
Contiguous United States
Alaska
Hawaii
1
194
237
343
2
357
435
630
3
511
622
902
4
649
790
1146
5
771
939
1361
6
925
1127
1633
7
1022
1245
1805
8
1169
1423
2063
Each additional member
146
178
258
Minimum Monthly Benefit ($)
Household Size
Contiguous United States
Alaska
Hawaii
1 or 2
16
19
28
3 or more
0
0
0
Source: “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) Information,” Food and
Nutrition Service, last published April 3, 2018.
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Table A.3 SNAP Participation and Benefits According to Different Data Sources: Survey
Information, Administrative Records, and Constructed Estimates, 2012–15
Year
Reported
Administrative

2012
Average Individual Participation
(thousands)
Average Individual Benefit
($)
Total Benefits
($ millions)
2013
Average Individual Participation
(thousands)
Average Individual Benefit
($)
Total Benefits
($ millions)
2014
Average Individual Participation
(thousands)
Average Individual Benefit
($)
Total Benefits
($ millions)
2015
Average Individual Participation
(thousands)
Average Individual Benefit
($)
Total Benefits
($ millions)

Food Stamp

SPM SNAP

Participating

Estimated

33,766

37,515

42,129

49,661

93.81

93.72

135.18

126.64

35,653

37,041

68,339

74,656

34,016

37,795

43,231

48,969

89.89

89.59

135.12

124.7

34,453

35,632

70,095

71,833

35,624

39,669

42,300

51,162

89.48

89.16

126.97

113.24

35,929

37,275

64,452

68,874

34,222

38,260

41,554

50,965

89.36

88.63

129.49

110.97

33,353

34,655

64,571

66,540

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC and Gray and Cunnyngham 2016.
Notes: Participation and benefit totals in the official participation report differ from participation levels and total
benefits redeemed on the USDA Food and Nutrition Service website because certain individuals and spending (like
disaster assistance) are excluded from the figures in the report. Data on 2016 is not provided because the
administrative report for 2016 is not currently available.
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Table A.4 Population Size by Demographic Characteristics, 2012–16
Group

Mean
(thousands)

Race
Non-Hispanic Whites
Non-Hispanic Blacks
Hispanic
Other
Total
Family Work Status
(Households)
Working Families
Nonworking Families
Total
Age
Children
Nonelderly Adults
Elderly Adults
Total

184,755
36,533
51,324
24,729
297,340

86,709
32,269
118,978
71,514
180,871
44,955
297,340

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2012–16 CPS-ASEC.
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